“Said one among them – Surely not in vain ‘My substance of the common earth was ta’en ‘And to this figure moulded, to be broke, ‘or trampled back to shapeless earth again.’ Then said a Second – Ne’er a peevish boy would break the bowl from which he drank in joy, ‘And he that with his hand the vessel made’ Will surely not in after wrath destroy.” – Omar Khayyam ( by Edward Fitzgerald)

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

The eastern revolt against the leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) led by Vinayagamurthy Muralitharan alias Karuna ended on Easter Day (April 11) after the former Batticaloa – Amparai commander made a discreet deal with the estranged Tiger hierarchy based in the northern mainland of the Wanni. Karuna had already suspended fighting the previous day which was also Holy Saturday according to Christian tenets.

Hostilities had commenced in the early hours of Friday April 12 observed as Good Friday by Christians all over the world including the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. According to knowledgeable sources, the settlement was worked out primarily by an important and well-known personality based in a Western country deeply involved with the Sri Lankan peace process. Other well-meaning individuals in Sri Lanka and abroad ranging from clergymen to journalists were involved too at different levels and in different degrees. The objective was not political but deeply humanistic.

The lives of LTTE cadres on both sides, the safe return of child conscripts to their homes, safety and peaceful life of civilians and the overall impact on the east were the issues at stake. It is therefore a matter of great satisfaction for those that strove hard to end this intra-Tiger conflict peacefully that Karuna as well as the LTTE hierarchy took into account all the ramifications and decided in the best interests of their cadres, people and themselves to end the armed hostilities.

The arrangements

According to the arrangement worked out, Karuna was required to provide and deliver on certain undertakings.

1) To cease fighting permanently.

2) To disband and disperse his forces and send them home.

3) To facilitate arrangements for the smooth handing over of military assets including arms, armaments and ammunition to the LTTE.

4) To release all Tigers and supporters in Karuna’s custody safely

5) To vacate “the soil of Tamil Eelam” (North – Eastern Province) immediately and never return to it again.

6) To refrain from any direct or indirect military or political activity in future.

7) To maintain silence about all matters concerning the LTTE and avoid all related media publicity.

8) To seek a new life outside Sri Lanka as early as possible.

In return the LTTE provided these assurances to Karuna. The LTTE –

1) Will not deter Karuna leaving the east or Sri Lanka.

2) Will not try to eliminate him while in Sri Lanka or abroad.

3) Will not demand return of any money or things of value taken away by Karuna.

4) Will not harm all cadres under Karuna’s control and allow them to return to a normal life.

5) To reabsorb only those cadres willing to rejoin the movement.

6) To refrain from punishing all senior cadres who stood by Karuna against the LTTE leadership.

7) To permit them wherever possible to leave the east and /Sri Lanka.

8) To refrain from taking revenge on eastern civilians who supported Karuna and engaged in acts like burning effigies, destroying Tiger offices etc.

Once this arrangement was agreed upon Karuna formally called off his revolt and ordered his cadres to hand over their weapons, uniforms, cyanide capsules, and identity tags etc and go home. The process began from Easter Sunday morning onwards and ended on Monday. Karuna himself left Batticaloa on Monday for Colombo. He is expected to travel to a South East Asian country shortly.

The chief reason for Karuna calling it quits after engaging in quite a lot of bravado was because of two over arching factors. One was that he had been outsmarted and checkmated by the LTTE leadership on a number of fronts. The second was a practical dilemma where he was confronted with difficult choices. Long simmering tensions between Karuna and the LTTE leadership reached a flashpoint on March 1 this year when Karuna arrested a number of intelligence wing operatives working in the east under the command of Pottu Amman. They had been summoned for a meeting at ‘Thenagam’ the LTTE political headquarters at Karadiyanaru. Among them was the Deputy Chief, Intelligence, Sinnathamby alias Neelan.

Emergency summit

Karuna and Paduman the Trincomalee District head were immediately summoned to the Wanni for an emergency summit. Karuna had been asked to come from last year to face several disciplinary charges but had refused to do so. Paduman went over on March 2 to Kilinochchi and was quickly relieved of his post as it was feared that he would align with Karuna. Sornam was appointed Trincomalee chief on special assignment. Karuna then revolted openly.

On March 3 he informed Norway officially of his stance and wanted Oslo to negotiate a separate agreement between him and the Colombo government. He claimed that he was for peace and development. Karuna hoped to be recognised as a distinct eastern entity on par with Velupillai Pirapaharan. Karuna was at a great disadvantage because of the timing. Had the war been on at the time Karuna rebelled against Pirapaharan the eastern leader would have been eagerly welcomed by Colombo. Unfortunately for Karuna it was a time of peace.

The LTTE was still firmly involved in the peace process and was adhering to the ceasefire vis a vis Colombo. There was no room for Karuna to manoeuvre in that situation. The big powers, global and regional as well as the facilitator Norway judged the Karuna revolt only in terms of its impact on the peace process. Despite the pro-Tiger elements shouting themselves hoarse about an external hand being involved, the revolt was essentially home grown. The danger was that some extraneous force could exploit the situation later.

But with the LTTE remaining in the process and threatening to revise its stance if Colombo or any other force was seen to back Karuna the options for the renegade leader became limited. In a bid to appease the Tigers and preserve the peace process everyone abandoned Karuna. The worst offender being the monitoring mission which in a betrayal of its mandate suspended activity in the eastern areas controlled by Karuna. The harsh home truth for Tamils and Muslims living in the north – east is that Colombo and the international community is only concerned about the LTTE not breaking the ceasefire and resuming fighting. As long as this is not done the Tigers can do many things with impunity. Some ‘token’ protests would be made and nothing more.

The assassinations of EPDP and EPRLF (Varathan wing) cadres, killing of civilians, conscription of minors, extortion and related abduction, the denial of democracy, the manipulation of the electoral process, etc are all clear examples. Now it was Karuna’s turn. As long as the armed forces were not drawn into the conflict even the wholesale massacre of young innocents on Karuna’s side by the LTTE would not have mattered.

No help for Karuna

Karuna realised belatedly that he would not be getting any help from any external source in attling Tiger onslaughts. Then came the long awaited Tiger attacks. Karuna could not hold them off at the district’s borders or adjacent areas as he had intended to do earlier. The Tigers militarily outmanoeuvred him. There was also no possibility of external assistance. Even the eastern coast was not under his control. Complicating matters further for Karuna was the composition of the Tiger invasionary force. It consisted mainly of eastern cadres (85% – 90 %). The clashes at Verugal demonstrated that the invaders could be ruthless notwithstanding regional affiliations. Several cadres belonging to Karuna were massacred in cold blood in the Verugal area. This is an ugly fact that the LTTE is suppressing from coming out. In addition there have been quite a lot of casualties on both sides. Certainly more than the four or five “martyrs” whose names were released officially by the LTTE.

The damage on Karuna’s side too is great. In keeping with typical Tiger conduct neither the LTTE mainstream nor the rebel faction acknowledge the loss of lives openly and may even deny it but the truth will not go away. Against this backdrop of being outsmarted by the LTTE, Karuna faced a difficult choice. After the initial debacle Karuna ordered all his cadres to fall back to certain areas. These were essentially areas in Paduvankarai to the west of the lagoon like Kokkatticholai, Karadiyanaaru, Aayithiyamalai and the hinterland areas of Tharavai, Vadamunai, Kudumbimalai (Thoppigala) etc.

With around 3500 to 4000 fighters in a fortified rectangular stretch of territory having jungles and hills there was a chance of prolonging the fighting. Karuna’s military headquarters base ‘Meenaham’ as well as his jungle base ‘Marutham’ were in this area.

The practical problem was that without external assistance serious logistical problems would have occurred. The Tigers would have steadily cut off all supplies. This would have created major difficulties like shortage of provisions, ammunition, fuel etc. Moreover, the fighting would have been fierce resulting in a lot of casualties. The ferocity displayed by the LTTE at the Verugal area showed that they would be equally harsh in the fighting here. It did not matter to those eastern cadres fighting on behalf of Pirapaharan that the opposite side consisted of eastern children of the soil too. What mattered was victory at any cost notwithstanding the massive publicity given in LTTE media about the Tiger national leader Velupillai Pirapaharan having instructed cadres to retrieve the east without bloodshed.

But in Karuna’s case he had taken the moral high ground by supposedly fighting for the eastern Tamil against Northern domination. He was therefore bound to the well- being and welfare of the Eastern Tamils. Ultimately it would not matter who won because the casualties on either side would be from the east. One of the reasons trotted out by Karuna in explaining the split was his refusal to send 1000 Eastern cadres to the Wanni. Karuna said that he would not allow Eastern cadres sacrificing their lives unnecessarily. The tone and tenor of his rebellion seemed to be a desire to end deaths on the battlefield.

Moral dilemma

Moreover Karuna had a moral dilemma. His justification for the revolt was that the east needed peace to prosper. He had gone on record publicly that he did not favour war. But now war had caught up with him. If the conflict continued much of Batticaloa’s youth would be decimated. The lives of the people and their way of life could be endangered. What a cruel irony for a man who wanted peace and prosperity for his people to cause just the opposite of that. Karuna was also besieged by several parents of the children in the LTTE. The parents were not only those fighting on Karuna’s side but also of those Batticaloa men fighting on Pirapaharan’s side too. As an irate father told Karuna ” aar sethalum nammadai pillaigal thane ?” (Whoever dies they are all our children no?) Karuna also knew that at Verugal those who surrendered without fighting had been spared but others who resisted were brutally murdered.

The propaganda barrage for and against Karuna ignores a salient aspect of Karuna’s personality and past. Until the split he was truly committed to the LTTE ideology and organisation. He had led the eastern Tigers for a record 17 years and had also fought almost every major battle in the north – east. Karuna built up the LTTE in the east. These young cadres were committed to him. Now was he going to destroy the movement by extending the intra-Tiger conflict? Was he going to sacrifice all those Batticaloa kids who stood by him?

Another problem was his own safety in the future. Even if he managed to escape or hold the Tigers off he would always be a marked man. After bitter fighting the LTTE would always target him and those close to him. The LTTE had offered him an amnesty earlier. He thought of availing himself of it even at this late juncture. If these were the reasons compelling Karuna to seek an end to the fighting the mainstream LTTE too needed peace. The LTTE propagandists may view all things militarily and boast that the great leader would solve all things.

The reality however is different. Removing Karuna from the arena of conflict peacefully was better than using military force. A protracted confrontation with Karuna would lead inevitably to great loss of lives and destruction. The scars of such a fraternal fight would be permanent. Even if the Tigers succeeded in eliminating Karuna after a savage fight, the LTTE would thereafter find it difficult to maintain control of the east in the way it had done so earlier. Moreover, there was every chance that Karuna would have reverted to guerrilla warfare after some positional warfare. This could have created a new set of problems.

Eastern martyr

Also if Karuna was killed then he would have become an eastern martyr. The LTTE may state for propaganda purposes that Karuna was a single individual without mass support. Now that the LTTE has gained ascendancy even those who stood with Karuna may now change their stance. The reality however is that Karuna did enjoy substantial support among sections of the people after the revolt. He continues to have dormant support even now. This is particularly so among eastern Tamil expatriates. Also the bulk of eastern cadres remained with him though a large number of ‘officer’ level cadres deserted him. Even after desertions Karuna would still have had about 3500 cadres with him. Of these about 1000 – 1500 could have remained loyal throughout. Around 500 would have died for him. So a long duel with Karuna was not to the LTTE’s liking too.

There was also the danger of protracted fighting spilling over to government controlled areas in a big way. If that happened the armed forces could have been drawn in gradually. If so the chances were that Karuna would be favoured at ground level. The LTTE could threaten to break off the ceasefire. If that did really happen then the Tigers would be blamed. It must not be forgotten that despite Norway washing its hands off in Pontius Pilate fashion the truth is that the LTTE is guilty of serious ceasefire violations in transporting cadres to the east and starting the conflict.

Given all these it was in the interest of both Karuna and the LTTE to call off the fighting and go in for a ‘silent’ truce. The LTTE had always hinted that it could allow Karuna to leave the east if he ended the revolt. Even the statement released on April 10 after the Good Friday fighting indicated this by saying that efforts are underway to expel Karuna from Tamil Eelam soil. So the Tigers adopted an undeclared suspension of hostilities on April 10 that was reciprocated by Karuna. After intense negotiations undertaken basically through telephone, an arrangement of sorts was arrived at. Verbal assurances were given. Karuna faxed a letter outlining assurances.

While both sides agreed to refrain from publicising the arrangement for respective reasons of their own, the actual implementation began in the early hours of Sunday morning. Karuna instructed his deputies to disband the cadres, decommission arms and send them to their homes in civilian clothing without their Tiger identity cards, uniforms and cyanide capsules. In certain camps the discarded uniforms were discarded and burnt in a bonfire. More than 3500 cadres were sent away from camps. LTTE mainstream cadres began moving into vacated areas.

A positive feature of the current situation is that the LTTE mainstream cadres moving into Batticaloa and Amparai have not punished anyone so far. Some senior cadres like women’s political wing chief Thenukha have been reinducted into the movement again. As for other cadres, those willing to join the LTTE again will be screened and reabsorbed if found suitable. Since eastern LTTE leaders familiar with the cadres are holding the reins the transition seems smooth.

Problems yet to begin

The problems could begin when Pottu Amman’s men move in to identify the involvement of people in the revolt. The Tigers have announced that ex-cadres of Karuna should register themselves at the nearest LTTE office within 48 hours. This may be a procedure to weed out the staunch pro-Karuna elements and re-induct others. If so the fate of those hard core Karuna loyalists becomes a question mark.

It is to be hoped that human rights activists would raise their voices in protest at least now and prevent a terrible internal purge. One aspect of the LTTE – Karuna agreement is that while Karuna is barred from speaking to the media the Tigers are not. We find therefore the Tiger media organs blacking out details of the agreement reached and projecting vicious accusations against Karuna. There could be many stories of intensive searches for him. After all history is written by the victors.

The LTTE is industriously accusing Karuna of many things including making deals with Sri Lankan intelligence and defence authorities. There may be some truth in that despite hollow denials by Defence Secretary, Cyril Herath who learnt intelligence methods in Israel. The Defence Ministry has issued a formal denial.

Army chief Balagalle at least has been candid in interviews to the Indian media accepting that he was in contact with Karuna. Also his hand has been fully exposed in the matter of trying to control the movements of Eastern Tamil National Alliance MPs who were allegedly in Karuna’s camp last week. Now all of them will swear that they were Pirapaharan loyalists all along. If the LTTE does find proof and establish that Karuna is hand in glove with Sri Lankan intelligence or military intelligence, then the agreement it has entered into will no longer be valid. Karuna will be a ‘legitimate’ victim from a Tiger perspective. Already the alleged killing of Lt. Col Neelan Sinnathamby by Karuna on April 12 is viewed as a violation of agreement principles by Karuna.

Blow to macho image

He was required to release all Tiger operatives in custody. The LTTE with its macho image will not like to publicise the fact that they entered into an agreement with Karuna and let him go away. The Tigers who claim that they like elephants never forget a fault will target Karuna at some point of time. Karuna’ s offences in LTTE eyes are unforgivable. Karuna knows it too. Sadly the militaristic LTTE does not realise that revealing details of an agreement with Karuna to avoid bloodshed and suffering will only enhance the LTTE reputation as being humanistic.

The Tigers fear that any act of compromise or mercy is infra-dig for them. So the LTTE is likely to deny all suggestions of an agreement and instead keep up the faade of a deadly manhunt for Karuna being on. Karuna too may have had an ulterior motive in suing for peace. He may have realised that there is no ‘opening’ for him in a peaceful situation. The idea may be to bide his time quietly and then surface if and when the ceasefire breaks and war erupts.

Whatever the possible crafty motives of Karuna or on the part of the LTTE there is no denying that this unpublicised agreement has benefited the people of Batticaloa. The reaction in the east to Karuna giving up so quickly is two-fold. On the one hand there is resentment that he abandoned his cadres and caved in to the LTTE after raising the banner of revolt so fiercely. And there is relief that he called it quits because the region and people have been spared bloodshed.

What is of singular satisfaction to the eastern Tamils is that a major fratricidal fight has been avoided. Thousands of cadres are going back home instead of being cannon fodder. Conscripted minors are being released. The LTTE too is being tolerant and accommodative at least for the present.

With the LTTE ruling the roost again the name ‘Karuna’ would become a dirty word not to be spoken in public with approval. Karuna’ s revolt however will not be forgotten. It will linger in eastern memories for a long time.