“There is a misperception that this conflict merely involves two ethnic communities – the Tamil people and the Sinhala people. While it may be possible to look at the CFA in that light because the CFA involves a cessation of hostilities between an armed Tamil group and the government of Sri Lanka, the CFA does nothing to solve the problems of the Muslim people. These problems can only be resolved by adopting a political approach that goes beyond the CFA and in that process it is very necessary, indeed indispensable, that the voice of the Muslim people be heard…….It is imperative that the voice of the Muslim community should be heard on behalf of their displaced people at the negotiating table itself”. – Lakshman Kadirgamar in Parliament on October 21, 2003

By D. B. S. Jeyaraj

Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga deserves to be congratulated for initiating steps to revive the defunct peace process. Instead of being constrained by her earlier stance of displaying hostility towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) she has extended the olive branch to the Tigers.

Whatever her hidden agenda may be the act of trying to talk to the LTTE again is by itself commendable because of the harsh reality that lasting peace would not be possible without Tiger consent.

Chandrika’s U turn

As stated in these columns earlier, Kumaratunga is performing a remarkable U turn now as earlier and she and her party along with the new ally had all been unequivocally critical of several aspects of the Oslo brokered peace process .

Despite facing the polls on a platform criticising the process she now seems to be following in the footsteps of Former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe thereby implying that the United National Front (UNF) had done nothing wrong in pursuing peace with the LTTE.

Unfortunately Kumaratunga in her burning desire to establish rapport with the LTTE and get the peace process going smoothly seems prepared to sideline or ignore other claims capable of affecting or retarding this objective.

However, just as these other claims may be, they are all of no consequence at present as far as Kumaratunga is concerned because her paramount goal is to curry favour with the Tigers and resume talks as soon as possible.

A major casualty in this respect is the just and legitimate claim of the Sri Lankan Muslim community that it should be represented at the talks along with representatives of the Sinhala and Tamil communities.

Due to practical necessity the government does not seem keen in accommodating the Muslims at the talks during this juncture because the LTTE is opposed to it. This is nothing but crass opportunism as this government during its opposition phase had been severely critical of the UNF for not making the talks tripartite.

The LTTE continues to remain rigid on the question of including a separate Muslim delegation at the talks as a third party. The statement issued by United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) General Secretary Susil Premjayanth endorses this stand implicitly.

The LTTE does not deny that the Muslims have particular problems needing resolution but are reluctant to award third party status at the talks at this point of time.

There is a feeling shared by several Tamils that the Muslims need not be given representation at the talks because the community did not “fight for its rights against Sinhala might” like the Tamils.

The Muslims are perceived as the ‘third party’ that chose to throw in its lot with the Sinhala rulers of the day instead of joining hands with their Tamil speaking brethren and fight for their rights.

The Muslims are being depicted as ‘cats on the wall’ now jumping into the fray and demanding their fair share without sacrificing anything in the struggle.

The Muslim leaders have not made things easier by their disunity and unrealistic, ill expressed sentiments.

The Muslims are yet to forge a common front and articulate their aspirations in concrete form. Many engage in provocative utterances against the Tamil people in their anger towards the Tigers.

No Muslim leader in recent times has expressed support for any legitimate demand proposed by the Tamils. Instead some only parrot the cry that the Muslims should be given whatever that is given to the Tamils. Others make threats that the Muslims will sabotage Tamil aspirations.

All this increases Tamil trepidation that the Muslims will be used as an undermining factor by the Sinhala power structure. The fear that Muslims as a third party in the talks will side with the Sinhalese to the detriment of the Tamils is one reason for Tamil reluctance in accommodating Muslims.

Added to these general Tamil doubts is the particular Tiger trait of hogging all power for themselves. The LTTE does not want any other Tamil party at the talks. They do not want to share the limelight with even their parliamentary slaves the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). So the Muslims come further down in LTTE pecking (or chewing) order.

Compounding matters further is the systematic propaganda by interested parties among Tamils that only the Tamils suffered in the ethnic strife at the hands of the Sinhala state and that the Muslims were spared suffering. Furthermore, the action of some Muslim homeguards and criminal mobs in attacking Tamils in collaboration with the security forces is highlighted. So Muslims need not participate in talks as they are not affected goes this line of thought.

Muslims indeed suffered

The truth however is that Muslims of the north – east have indeed suffered. By a tragic irony they suffered more at the hands of their Tamil speaking brethren. The mass expulsion of Muslims from the north and all their possessions being seized is a human tragedy.

The gunning down of Muslims while praying at the mosques of Kattankudi and Sammanthurai are terribe crimes against humanity; the massacre of innocents in places like Eravur, Alinchipattanai and Muthukkal etc. are horrors indeed.

The continuous abduction and taxation of eastern Muslims, the protracted yet regular killings of Muslims, the seizure of lands and livestock, restrictions imposed on trade and fishing, the engineered ‘riots’ etc. are all proof of Muslim suffering at the hands of the LTTE and by extension the Tamils.

Moreover, there is a fundamental difference between the LTTE perspective of the ethnic problem and other parties notably the Sinhala and Muslim parties. The LTTE sees the crisis as one between two nations namely “Sinhala” Sri Lanka and “Tamil” Eelam. The problem can only be resolved on that basis. Many Tamils subscribe to this viewpoint and not everyone is a Tiger.

The other position is that Sri Lanka belongs to all its people and that the north-east is only the area of historic habitation of the Tamil people. If the Sinhala hegemonists claim Sri Lanka is the exclusive preserve of the Sinhala Buddhist people the Tamil ultranationalists want it to be divided in two. The third and appropriate option is to recognise this country for what it is exactly and treat it as such – a truly multi-ethnic, multi-religious country.

Since the LTTE subscribes to the two nation theory there is no space in its vision for tripartite talks. If Muslims want to be included they can attend as part of the government delegation as Rauf Hakeem did in the UNF-LTTE talks. Later a separate Muslim delegation can be included when the particular problems of north-eastern Muslims are discussed.

The LTTE in its proposal for an interim administrative council for the north-eastern Province says nothing explicitly about rights of the Muslims. There is an ambiguous clause about negotiations with Muslim representatives and the LTTE. Presumably both parties will be discussing matters of concern to the Muslims at some point of time.

A press conference was held in Kilinochchi on May 11 after Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jan Petersen met LTTE leader Velupillai Pirapaharan. Tiger political adviser and chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham conducted it. One question asked of him was about Muslim participation in talks.

Balasingham replied that there were several matters needing finalisation regarding direct talks between the government and the LTTE. Therefore, it was not practical for Muslims to be included as a separate entity at the talks now. Later when problems affecting Muslims are discussed they could be accommodated as a third party.

Thus the LTTE is following its earlier line. It does not deny the Muslims a place at the negotiating table but says the time is not ripe. The LTTE will keep the talks bilateral as long as possible as there is lurking suspicion that people like Ferial Ashraff and A.H.M. Athaullah will be pliable tools of their Sinhala bosses in thwarting Tamil aspirations.

The Kumaratunga government like that of its predecessor has taken the path of least resistance. Using the Tiger stance as a convenient excuse the UPFA too does not want to include the Muslims at the talks now. The statement issued by Premjayanth tries to cite precedent in justifying the position that only the LTTE and UPFA will be represented at the talks.

Kumaratunga’s chief focus at present is to ingratiate herself with the LTTE and get the talks started. So even Kadirgamar – Bala Annai’s bete noir – will be excluded from the talks for fear of irritating the Tigers. Fat chance then for the Muslims to be included right now.

So the very same People’s Alliance that criticised Wickremesinghe severely for omitting Muslim representation at the earlier talks is now going to emulate the UNF in its new avatar as UPFA. The very same Ferial Ashraff and Athaullah who were critical of Hakeem for not pushing Muslim claims for separate representation will now keep quiet as they are part of the government.

The Muslim Congress now in the opposition is better positioned to take on the government for excluding the Muslims. There was a time when Rauf Hakeem boasted that no government could be made or unmade without SLMC help. The present government lacking a viable majority is already in the saddle.

Two conditions

Efforts however are on to woo the Muslim Congress. Hakeem told the Navamani a Tamil journal specialising in Muslim affairs that 10 ‘posts’ had been offered to the SLMC if it joined the government. The SLMC politburo after prolonged discussions on May 10 decided that it would support the government on two conditions namely abandoning the constituent assembly proposal and ensuring separate Muslim participation at the peace talks.

The response of Kumaratunga towards the SLMC offer is yet to be seen. However attractive the offer is the government will be wary in accepting it if the separate Muslim delegation demand is non – negotiable. Her priority is to keep the Tigers happy and keep the talks going. Hakeem agreeing to defer the demand for a while may be welcome.

In any event Kumaratunga is very likely to get 10 Up Country Tamil seats (CWC -8;UCPF -2) directly in her fold very soon. Also if talks get going with the LTTE there is also the prospect of 22 TNA parliamentarians supporting her and at the very least not opposing her. So SLMC support, though welcome may not be that important if the arrangement upsets the LTTE.

While Kumaratunga’s practical difficulties in accommodating a Muslim delegation is understandable her attitude however cannot be condoned. Expediency at the cost of principle is not acceptable under any circumstance. As Executive President she has to hold the scales evenly among all communities. Moreover a large number of north – eastern Muslims voted for her party despite the JVP link because they expected a fair deal from her.

The simple truth

Whatever the LTTE may say the simple truth is that there is no valid reason whatsoever for excluding a separate Muslim delegation to the talks at any point of time. The Muslims are the third largest ethnicity in the island and the second largest community in the north – east. The north – east is the traditional homeland of the Muslims too. Besides recent demographic changes have made Muslims the single largest entity in the east.

The argument that the Muslims could be included at the appropriate time when issues affecting them are discussed is not valid. The Interim Self – Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal of the LTTE is not a simple idea to be disposed of quickly. It requires much discussion and would need intense negotiations that constitutional reform talks will take.

The Muslims cannot be relegated to a ‘second eleven’ role in this. Also one cannot see how the Muslims can be excluded from discussions on issues not affecting them as opposed to being included in discussions on matters affecting them. The Muslims are 37% of the east and 18% of the eorth-east. They are or were (before expulsion) living in every district of the N-E. They are the majority in two districts.

The Muslims have an inalienable right to participate in any meaningful discussions aimed at determining the future of Sri Lanka in general and the north-east in particular. So, be it the composition, structure, powers, functions etc. of the proposed ISGA, the Muslim representatives have to be involved in each aspect because every issue affects them.

Apart from direct military matters concerning the government and LTTE all other issues involve Muslims too. If negotiations without Tamil representatives is like staging the Ramayana without Rama then talks without Muslim representatives is like the same epic without Lakshmana. Neither the government nor the Tigers are granting any concession to the Muslims. They simply have to recognise Muslim rights and not seek to suppress them.

The LTTE is adopting double standards when it says on the one hand that talks should resume on the basis where it ended last year and say on the other that Muslims can be included only when matters progress and during finalisation.

If things are to begin from the point where it ended last year then the Muslims have to be included as the decision had already been made. If the Muslims are to be kept out on the premise that everything is beginning anew then even discussions on the ISGA cannot take place.

The demand for Muslim inclusion at the talks is not a fresh demand. It is an old one. More importantly it is one that had gained acceptance from all parties concerned. The LTTE, UNF, Norway, international community etc. have all agreed on the matter. Let us refresh our memory on this issue.

A debate

A debate was held in parliament on the initiative of the north – eastern Muslim Parliamentary forum on October 21, 2003. Rauf Hakeem tabling the motion outlined clearly the prevailing consensus on the issue. This is what Hakeem said then.

“Whereas the leaders of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the LTTE in a joint statement dated April 13, 2001 agreed that Muslims should be represented at future negotiations for peace by a separate delegation.

Whereas on September 3, 2002 a press release issued by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in London following a meeting between Rauf Hakeem and Dr. Anton Balasingham, chief negotiator of the LTTE announced that it was agreed between them that Rauf Hakeem would participate at future rounds of peace talks as the head of a Muslim delegation representing the community.

“Whereas in the opening statement, head of the government delegation at the inaugural secession of the peace talks at Sattahip in Thailand, G. L. Peiris, emphasised that Rauf Hakeem will in due course participate in the talks in his capacity as leader of the SLMC and as the head of a Muslim delegation.

“Whereas it was agreed at the plenary session of the peace talks held in Oslo in November 2002 that ‘the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principles of internal self determination in areas of historical habitation of Tamil speaking people, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The parties acknowledged that the solution has to be acceptable to all communities.

“Whereas the Prime Minister in his opening remarks at the conference in Tokyo stated that participation of a Muslim delegation at future peace talks is necessary to take the peace process forward.

“Whereas the Tokyo Declaration expressly mentioned the participation of a Muslim delegation as agreed in the declaration at the fourth session of peace talks held in Thailand.

“Whereas the Prime Minister agreed with the leader of the SLMC and included in the discussion paper sent to the LTTE that a separate Muslim delegation should participate at the future rounds of peace talks.”

Hakeem ended his presentation by saying “I hope this makes a convincing case to field a separate delegation and I request your support.” If this was the situation just two weeks before Kumaratunga staged her unilateral action of seizing three ministries let us also look at the PA’s opinion on the matter.

Ten considerations

Lakshman Kadirgamar addressing parliament on October 21, 2003 during the course of the same debate made an eloquent address advocating a separate delegation for the Muslims. Like the 10 commandments of Moses or Moosa Nabhi as the Muslims call him, Kadirgamar spoke of 10 ‘considerations’ concerning the issue. .Relevant excerpts are as follows.

“The first consideration is that a durable peace can come only if the just aspirations of all communities in the country are met. Unless the Muslim interests are taken into account and accommodated there is no prospect whatsoever of a durable peace.

“The second consideration is that at the signing of the MOU Muslim concerns were not looked into. The Muslim community in the East is very seriously affected by the consequences of the CFA particularly by the lawless behaviour that is going on, much of it directed against the Muslim community under cover of the ceasefire.

“Thirdly, one of the many fundamental flaws in the CFA, and there are many, was that at the outset the government of the day either did not consult the SLMC which is a part of the government or the SLMC did not press their case for consultation at that time.

“The fourth consideration is that it is inadequate to approach this matter from the point of view of the so-called rights of the ethnic Tamil community alone. The Muslim dimension is something else, it is different.

“The fifth consideration is that there are a number of events which are occurring in the east which directly affect the Muslim people. Muslim villages are being threatened, the Muslims have a very clear sense of insecurity.

“The sixth consideration is that if this state of affairs is allowed to continue unchecked we will have another looming problem of immense magnitude – that is, the possibility of Muslim youth taking to arms. I ask everybody to reflect for a moment seriously about the enormous and far-reaching ramifications of such a situation, both domestically and internationally.

“The seventh consideration is that it is common knowledge that when the Muslims who lived in the Northern Province for more than a century were summarily evicted from their traditional habitation by the LTTE, and were rendered displaced overnight, they lost their homes and their livelihoods.

“The eighth consideration is that on April 13, 2002 after a meeting between the SLMC leader and the LTTE leader there appears to have been an understanding that the SLMC would lead a Muslim delegation to the talks. As of today nothing has come of that understanding.

“The ninth consideration is that the Muslim community who are most directly affected by the ongoing situation must be able to choose the composition of their delegation and the line of representations that they wish to advance.

“The tenth consideration is this. It seems that the leader of the SLMC has found that it has not been possible for him to make his case within the government delegation. He has not been able to carry the government with him in presenting the case of the Muslim community and therefore it appears that he now seeks a wider mandate from the most appropriate forum of all – that is parliament.”

It can be seen therefore that all parties including the present government support the presence of an independent Muslim delegation at the talks. Kadirgamar thundered at the government benches while in the opposition. Now he is part of the government and the country looks up to him to do justice by the Muslims. This column concludes by quoting significant paragraphs from Kadirgamar’s Parliamentary address on October 21.

Reasonable request

“They (Muslims) wish to be represented clearly and solely on the basis of their own interests whether or not those interests converge with the interests of the government and the LTTE, and that is what they are asking for. They are asking for an independent place at the negotiations. That request is eminently reasonable and justified.

“At the moment the negotiations are scheduled between the government and the LTTE. This itself is a flawed situation because the process is exclusive; it is not an expansive process that takes into account the aspirations of all the communities of the country. It is a highly restricted process.

“Therefore, the Muslim community as one of the communities directly affected in the north and east by a final political outcome seeks to be represented independently as a third party to the negotiations which are supposed to lead to an overall political solution. There cannot be a viable final and durable political solution to the problem unless the Muslim community is heard and accommodated in its own right and not by proxy.

“There should not be dictation or manipulation by other parties with regard to the composition of the delegation and the position that they might wish to take. The intrinsic merits, at a political level, of the Muslim case for participation in the talks have been considerably reinforced by a large segment of global opinion.

“The government must now clearly indicate without any hesitation whatsoever that it is prepared to stand by the Tokyo Declaration, and it must indicate without any ambivalence that it has the political will to support that declaration.

“The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) has no hesitation whatsoever in endorsing what we consider to be the just claim of the Muslims to be separately represented at the ongoing talks in order to place their case fully with a view to achieving a final political solution which is to their satisfaction. This is their right. They cannot be denied that right.”

“Said one among them – Surely not in vain ‘My substance of the common earth was ta’en ‘And to this figure moulded, to be broke, ‘or trampled back to shapeless earth again.’ Then said a Second – Ne’er a peevish boy would break the bowl from which he drank in joy, ‘And he that with his hand the vessel made’ Will surely not in after wrath destroy.” – Omar Khayyam ( by Edward Fitzgerald)

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

The eastern revolt against the leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) led by Vinayagamurthy Muralitharan alias Karuna ended on Easter Day (April 11) after the former Batticaloa – Amparai commander made a discreet deal with the estranged Tiger hierarchy based in the northern mainland of the Wanni. Karuna had already suspended fighting the previous day which was also Holy Saturday according to Christian tenets.

Hostilities had commenced in the early hours of Friday April 12 observed as Good Friday by Christians all over the world including the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. According to knowledgeable sources, the settlement was worked out primarily by an important and well-known personality based in a Western country deeply involved with the Sri Lankan peace process. Other well-meaning individuals in Sri Lanka and abroad ranging from clergymen to journalists were involved too at different levels and in different degrees. The objective was not political but deeply humanistic.

The lives of LTTE cadres on both sides, the safe return of child conscripts to their homes, safety and peaceful life of civilians and the overall impact on the east were the issues at stake. It is therefore a matter of great satisfaction for those that strove hard to end this intra-Tiger conflict peacefully that Karuna as well as the LTTE hierarchy took into account all the ramifications and decided in the best interests of their cadres, people and themselves to end the armed hostilities.

The arrangements

According to the arrangement worked out, Karuna was required to provide and deliver on certain undertakings.

1) To cease fighting permanently.

2) To disband and disperse his forces and send them home.

3) To facilitate arrangements for the smooth handing over of military assets including arms, armaments and ammunition to the LTTE.

4) To release all Tigers and supporters in Karuna’s custody safely

5) To vacate “the soil of Tamil Eelam” (North – Eastern Province) immediately and never return to it again.

6) To refrain from any direct or indirect military or political activity in future.

7) To maintain silence about all matters concerning the LTTE and avoid all related media publicity.

8) To seek a new life outside Sri Lanka as early as possible.

In return the LTTE provided these assurances to Karuna. The LTTE –

1) Will not deter Karuna leaving the east or Sri Lanka.

2) Will not try to eliminate him while in Sri Lanka or abroad.

3) Will not demand return of any money or things of value taken away by Karuna.

4) Will not harm all cadres under Karuna’s control and allow them to return to a normal life.

5) To reabsorb only those cadres willing to rejoin the movement.

6) To refrain from punishing all senior cadres who stood by Karuna against the LTTE leadership.

7) To permit them wherever possible to leave the east and /Sri Lanka.

8) To refrain from taking revenge on eastern civilians who supported Karuna and engaged in acts like burning effigies, destroying Tiger offices etc.

Once this arrangement was agreed upon Karuna formally called off his revolt and ordered his cadres to hand over their weapons, uniforms, cyanide capsules, and identity tags etc and go home. The process began from Easter Sunday morning onwards and ended on Monday. Karuna himself left Batticaloa on Monday for Colombo. He is expected to travel to a South East Asian country shortly.

The chief reason for Karuna calling it quits after engaging in quite a lot of bravado was because of two over arching factors. One was that he had been outsmarted and checkmated by the LTTE leadership on a number of fronts. The second was a practical dilemma where he was confronted with difficult choices. Long simmering tensions between Karuna and the LTTE leadership reached a flashpoint on March 1 this year when Karuna arrested a number of intelligence wing operatives working in the east under the command of Pottu Amman. They had been summoned for a meeting at ‘Thenagam’ the LTTE political headquarters at Karadiyanaru. Among them was the Deputy Chief, Intelligence, Sinnathamby alias Neelan.

Emergency summit

Karuna and Paduman the Trincomalee District head were immediately summoned to the Wanni for an emergency summit. Karuna had been asked to come from last year to face several disciplinary charges but had refused to do so. Paduman went over on March 2 to Kilinochchi and was quickly relieved of his post as it was feared that he would align with Karuna. Sornam was appointed Trincomalee chief on special assignment. Karuna then revolted openly.

On March 3 he informed Norway officially of his stance and wanted Oslo to negotiate a separate agreement between him and the Colombo government. He claimed that he was for peace and development. Karuna hoped to be recognised as a distinct eastern entity on par with Velupillai Pirapaharan. Karuna was at a great disadvantage because of the timing. Had the war been on at the time Karuna rebelled against Pirapaharan the eastern leader would have been eagerly welcomed by Colombo. Unfortunately for Karuna it was a time of peace.

The LTTE was still firmly involved in the peace process and was adhering to the ceasefire vis a vis Colombo. There was no room for Karuna to manoeuvre in that situation. The big powers, global and regional as well as the facilitator Norway judged the Karuna revolt only in terms of its impact on the peace process. Despite the pro-Tiger elements shouting themselves hoarse about an external hand being involved, the revolt was essentially home grown. The danger was that some extraneous force could exploit the situation later.

But with the LTTE remaining in the process and threatening to revise its stance if Colombo or any other force was seen to back Karuna the options for the renegade leader became limited. In a bid to appease the Tigers and preserve the peace process everyone abandoned Karuna. The worst offender being the monitoring mission which in a betrayal of its mandate suspended activity in the eastern areas controlled by Karuna. The harsh home truth for Tamils and Muslims living in the north – east is that Colombo and the international community is only concerned about the LTTE not breaking the ceasefire and resuming fighting. As long as this is not done the Tigers can do many things with impunity. Some ‘token’ protests would be made and nothing more.

The assassinations of EPDP and EPRLF (Varathan wing) cadres, killing of civilians, conscription of minors, extortion and related abduction, the denial of democracy, the manipulation of the electoral process, etc are all clear examples. Now it was Karuna’s turn. As long as the armed forces were not drawn into the conflict even the wholesale massacre of young innocents on Karuna’s side by the LTTE would not have mattered.

No help for Karuna

Karuna realised belatedly that he would not be getting any help from any external source in attling Tiger onslaughts. Then came the long awaited Tiger attacks. Karuna could not hold them off at the district’s borders or adjacent areas as he had intended to do earlier. The Tigers militarily outmanoeuvred him. There was also no possibility of external assistance. Even the eastern coast was not under his control. Complicating matters further for Karuna was the composition of the Tiger invasionary force. It consisted mainly of eastern cadres (85% – 90 %). The clashes at Verugal demonstrated that the invaders could be ruthless notwithstanding regional affiliations. Several cadres belonging to Karuna were massacred in cold blood in the Verugal area. This is an ugly fact that the LTTE is suppressing from coming out. In addition there have been quite a lot of casualties on both sides. Certainly more than the four or five “martyrs” whose names were released officially by the LTTE.

The damage on Karuna’s side too is great. In keeping with typical Tiger conduct neither the LTTE mainstream nor the rebel faction acknowledge the loss of lives openly and may even deny it but the truth will not go away. Against this backdrop of being outsmarted by the LTTE, Karuna faced a difficult choice. After the initial debacle Karuna ordered all his cadres to fall back to certain areas. These were essentially areas in Paduvankarai to the west of the lagoon like Kokkatticholai, Karadiyanaaru, Aayithiyamalai and the hinterland areas of Tharavai, Vadamunai, Kudumbimalai (Thoppigala) etc.

With around 3500 to 4000 fighters in a fortified rectangular stretch of territory having jungles and hills there was a chance of prolonging the fighting. Karuna’s military headquarters base ‘Meenaham’ as well as his jungle base ‘Marutham’ were in this area.

The practical problem was that without external assistance serious logistical problems would have occurred. The Tigers would have steadily cut off all supplies. This would have created major difficulties like shortage of provisions, ammunition, fuel etc. Moreover, the fighting would have been fierce resulting in a lot of casualties. The ferocity displayed by the LTTE at the Verugal area showed that they would be equally harsh in the fighting here. It did not matter to those eastern cadres fighting on behalf of Pirapaharan that the opposite side consisted of eastern children of the soil too. What mattered was victory at any cost notwithstanding the massive publicity given in LTTE media about the Tiger national leader Velupillai Pirapaharan having instructed cadres to retrieve the east without bloodshed.

But in Karuna’s case he had taken the moral high ground by supposedly fighting for the eastern Tamil against Northern domination. He was therefore bound to the well- being and welfare of the Eastern Tamils. Ultimately it would not matter who won because the casualties on either side would be from the east. One of the reasons trotted out by Karuna in explaining the split was his refusal to send 1000 Eastern cadres to the Wanni. Karuna said that he would not allow Eastern cadres sacrificing their lives unnecessarily. The tone and tenor of his rebellion seemed to be a desire to end deaths on the battlefield.

Moral dilemma

Moreover Karuna had a moral dilemma. His justification for the revolt was that the east needed peace to prosper. He had gone on record publicly that he did not favour war. But now war had caught up with him. If the conflict continued much of Batticaloa’s youth would be decimated. The lives of the people and their way of life could be endangered. What a cruel irony for a man who wanted peace and prosperity for his people to cause just the opposite of that. Karuna was also besieged by several parents of the children in the LTTE. The parents were not only those fighting on Karuna’s side but also of those Batticaloa men fighting on Pirapaharan’s side too. As an irate father told Karuna ” aar sethalum nammadai pillaigal thane ?” (Whoever dies they are all our children no?) Karuna also knew that at Verugal those who surrendered without fighting had been spared but others who resisted were brutally murdered.

The propaganda barrage for and against Karuna ignores a salient aspect of Karuna’s personality and past. Until the split he was truly committed to the LTTE ideology and organisation. He had led the eastern Tigers for a record 17 years and had also fought almost every major battle in the north – east. Karuna built up the LTTE in the east. These young cadres were committed to him. Now was he going to destroy the movement by extending the intra-Tiger conflict? Was he going to sacrifice all those Batticaloa kids who stood by him?

Another problem was his own safety in the future. Even if he managed to escape or hold the Tigers off he would always be a marked man. After bitter fighting the LTTE would always target him and those close to him. The LTTE had offered him an amnesty earlier. He thought of availing himself of it even at this late juncture. If these were the reasons compelling Karuna to seek an end to the fighting the mainstream LTTE too needed peace. The LTTE propagandists may view all things militarily and boast that the great leader would solve all things.

The reality however is different. Removing Karuna from the arena of conflict peacefully was better than using military force. A protracted confrontation with Karuna would lead inevitably to great loss of lives and destruction. The scars of such a fraternal fight would be permanent. Even if the Tigers succeeded in eliminating Karuna after a savage fight, the LTTE would thereafter find it difficult to maintain control of the east in the way it had done so earlier. Moreover, there was every chance that Karuna would have reverted to guerrilla warfare after some positional warfare. This could have created a new set of problems.

Eastern martyr

Also if Karuna was killed then he would have become an eastern martyr. The LTTE may state for propaganda purposes that Karuna was a single individual without mass support. Now that the LTTE has gained ascendancy even those who stood with Karuna may now change their stance. The reality however is that Karuna did enjoy substantial support among sections of the people after the revolt. He continues to have dormant support even now. This is particularly so among eastern Tamil expatriates. Also the bulk of eastern cadres remained with him though a large number of ‘officer’ level cadres deserted him. Even after desertions Karuna would still have had about 3500 cadres with him. Of these about 1000 – 1500 could have remained loyal throughout. Around 500 would have died for him. So a long duel with Karuna was not to the LTTE’s liking too.

There was also the danger of protracted fighting spilling over to government controlled areas in a big way. If that happened the armed forces could have been drawn in gradually. If so the chances were that Karuna would be favoured at ground level. The LTTE could threaten to break off the ceasefire. If that did really happen then the Tigers would be blamed. It must not be forgotten that despite Norway washing its hands off in Pontius Pilate fashion the truth is that the LTTE is guilty of serious ceasefire violations in transporting cadres to the east and starting the conflict.

Given all these it was in the interest of both Karuna and the LTTE to call off the fighting and go in for a ‘silent’ truce. The LTTE had always hinted that it could allow Karuna to leave the east if he ended the revolt. Even the statement released on April 10 after the Good Friday fighting indicated this by saying that efforts are underway to expel Karuna from Tamil Eelam soil. So the Tigers adopted an undeclared suspension of hostilities on April 10 that was reciprocated by Karuna. After intense negotiations undertaken basically through telephone, an arrangement of sorts was arrived at. Verbal assurances were given. Karuna faxed a letter outlining assurances.

While both sides agreed to refrain from publicising the arrangement for respective reasons of their own, the actual implementation began in the early hours of Sunday morning. Karuna instructed his deputies to disband the cadres, decommission arms and send them to their homes in civilian clothing without their Tiger identity cards, uniforms and cyanide capsules. In certain camps the discarded uniforms were discarded and burnt in a bonfire. More than 3500 cadres were sent away from camps. LTTE mainstream cadres began moving into vacated areas.

A positive feature of the current situation is that the LTTE mainstream cadres moving into Batticaloa and Amparai have not punished anyone so far. Some senior cadres like women’s political wing chief Thenukha have been reinducted into the movement again. As for other cadres, those willing to join the LTTE again will be screened and reabsorbed if found suitable. Since eastern LTTE leaders familiar with the cadres are holding the reins the transition seems smooth.

Problems yet to begin

The problems could begin when Pottu Amman’s men move in to identify the involvement of people in the revolt. The Tigers have announced that ex-cadres of Karuna should register themselves at the nearest LTTE office within 48 hours. This may be a procedure to weed out the staunch pro-Karuna elements and re-induct others. If so the fate of those hard core Karuna loyalists becomes a question mark.

It is to be hoped that human rights activists would raise their voices in protest at least now and prevent a terrible internal purge. One aspect of the LTTE – Karuna agreement is that while Karuna is barred from speaking to the media the Tigers are not. We find therefore the Tiger media organs blacking out details of the agreement reached and projecting vicious accusations against Karuna. There could be many stories of intensive searches for him. After all history is written by the victors.

The LTTE is industriously accusing Karuna of many things including making deals with Sri Lankan intelligence and defence authorities. There may be some truth in that despite hollow denials by Defence Secretary, Cyril Herath who learnt intelligence methods in Israel. The Defence Ministry has issued a formal denial.

Army chief Balagalle at least has been candid in interviews to the Indian media accepting that he was in contact with Karuna. Also his hand has been fully exposed in the matter of trying to control the movements of Eastern Tamil National Alliance MPs who were allegedly in Karuna’s camp last week. Now all of them will swear that they were Pirapaharan loyalists all along. If the LTTE does find proof and establish that Karuna is hand in glove with Sri Lankan intelligence or military intelligence, then the agreement it has entered into will no longer be valid. Karuna will be a ‘legitimate’ victim from a Tiger perspective. Already the alleged killing of Lt. Col Neelan Sinnathamby by Karuna on April 12 is viewed as a violation of agreement principles by Karuna.

Blow to macho image

He was required to release all Tiger operatives in custody. The LTTE with its macho image will not like to publicise the fact that they entered into an agreement with Karuna and let him go away. The Tigers who claim that they like elephants never forget a fault will target Karuna at some point of time. Karuna’ s offences in LTTE eyes are unforgivable. Karuna knows it too. Sadly the militaristic LTTE does not realise that revealing details of an agreement with Karuna to avoid bloodshed and suffering will only enhance the LTTE reputation as being humanistic.

The Tigers fear that any act of compromise or mercy is infra-dig for them. So the LTTE is likely to deny all suggestions of an agreement and instead keep up the faade of a deadly manhunt for Karuna being on. Karuna too may have had an ulterior motive in suing for peace. He may have realised that there is no ‘opening’ for him in a peaceful situation. The idea may be to bide his time quietly and then surface if and when the ceasefire breaks and war erupts.

Whatever the possible crafty motives of Karuna or on the part of the LTTE there is no denying that this unpublicised agreement has benefited the people of Batticaloa. The reaction in the east to Karuna giving up so quickly is two-fold. On the one hand there is resentment that he abandoned his cadres and caved in to the LTTE after raising the banner of revolt so fiercely. And there is relief that he called it quits because the region and people have been spared bloodshed.

What is of singular satisfaction to the eastern Tamils is that a major fratricidal fight has been avoided. Thousands of cadres are going back home instead of being cannon fodder. Conscripted minors are being released. The LTTE too is being tolerant and accommodative at least for the present.

With the LTTE ruling the roost again the name ‘Karuna’ would become a dirty word not to be spoken in public with approval. Karuna’ s revolt however will not be forgotten. It will linger in eastern memories for a long time.

“Karuna knows in his deepest soul that Pirapaharan is beyond trivial regional sectarianism. Having lived and worked with Pirapaharan for more than 25 years I have never detected any shades of regionalism in his thoughts or action. Karuna’s accusation of regionalism in the LTTE leadership is unfounded and malicious. It is aimed to create confusion among his cadres.” – Anton Balasingham (Tamilnet of March 17, 2004)

By D. B. S. Jeyaraj

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Velupillai Pirapaharan may be guilty of many things but certainly not that of practicing regional sectarianism. Renegade eastern Tiger Leader, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna is unfair in falsely accusing his former leader on that count.

This column has been critical of the LTTE chief on many issues but has never levelled charges against him as a sectarian leader. Pirapaharan, who was actually born in Batticaloa and not Velvettithurai has to the best of my knowledge never subscribed to a Jaffna supremacist mentality.

Pirapaharan’s political vision is a broadone encompassing the length and breadth of Tamil Eelam extending from Point Pedro in the north to Pottuvil in the east and is not compartmentalised. He is like former LTTE Jaffna commander, Sathasivampillai Krishnakumar alias Kittu in that respect.

Whatever his faults in the Karuna affair, Pirapaharan cannot be accused of sectarian hegemonism. This column agrees with the views of LTTE political adviser Anton Balasingham that Karuna himself knows deep down that Pirapaharan is not guilty of what he is accusing him of.

The Tamilnet of March 17, 2004 has published an interview of Balasingham on the Karuna crisis. Relevant excerpts are as follows:

” Karuna knows in his deepest soul that Pirapaharan is beyond trivial regional sectarianism. Pirapaharan enjoys great admiration from his people for having built a unified national liberation movement transcending the divisions of class, caste, creed and regions that permeated the traditional Tamil society for centuries. From the very inception the LTTE leadership embraced the concepts of Tamil homeland and nationality as cardinal principles of the freedom struggle. Eighteen thousand freedom fighters and 80,000 Tamil civilians have sacrificed their lives for the cause of a single, unified Tamil homeland. Having lived and worked with Mr. Pirapaharan for more than 25 years, I have never detected any shades of regionalism in his thoughts or action. Karuna’s accusation of regionalism in the LTTE leadership is unfounded and malicious. It is aimed to create confusion among his cadres.

“I can quote an incident to prove how deeply Pirapaharan is committed to the principle of a single, indivisible Tamil homeland. During the Premadasa talks the former President, at one point, urged me to convey a message to Mr. Pirapaharan saying that he was willing to grant even political independence to the north as a separate Tamil state but he will never allow the Eastern Province to be part of the Tamil homeland. When I conveyed this message to the LTTE Leader he said, ‘Please tell Premadasa that he is even prepared to give up the north, but he will not, under any circumstances, be prepared to abandon the Eastern Province and its people.”‘

Karuna may have some grounds to charge the LTTE of discriminating against the east. Due to acts of omission and commission the east has not received the entitlement it deserves. There is certainly a structural imbalance in the administrative machinery of the movement that needs to be addressed.

Pirapaharan’s fault has been in not recognising this earlier and taking steps to rectify it institutionally. For that he may be blamed but to charge the LTTE leader as being partisan towards the north in a deliberate sense is a grievous error or terrible falsehood.

Pirapaharan has had a soft corner for the east and its particular problems. There was a time when he offered Paramadeva arms and assistance to function independently in the east. Paramadeva declined it and opted to work within the LTTE.

De facto leader

In recent times Pirapaharan allowed Karuna to develop several autonomous structures for the east. These were more or less parallel to those in the north. The idea was to develop the LTTE in the east to be on par with their northern counterparts. Karuna who duplicates the great heroes day ceremony at Tharavai was virtually a de facto eastern national leader.

Initially, there was a lot of sympathy for Karuna after breaking away from the LTTE. Karuna, however, seems to have crossed the lakshman rekha in going against the grain of the basic tenets of Tamil nationalism in his fight against the LTTE hierarchy. Whatever the merits or otherwise of his independent stance Karuna cannot raise the regional cry to the point of breaking up broader Tamil unity and also truncating the homeland concept.

As Balasingham says in Tamilnet :

“It is a tragic irony that a person who played major roles in a liberation war to redeem the Tamil homeland from Sinhala military occupation is now denouncing and renouncing the homeland concept, the very foundation of the Tamil freedom struggle.”

Karuna has damaged his own cause by rushing to espouse a rupture with the north and strike a separate deal for the east. His seeming readiness to compromise with Colombo but not Kilinochchi will not go down well with the Tamil people. The fundamental cause for the current ethnic crisis and several related problems is Sinhala majoritarian domination.

Sinhala hegemonistic politics has not gone away. The election phenomenon indicates that clearly. Karuna’s seeming intention to align with the major contradiction as opposed to the lesser one will not be acceptable to Tamil opinion at this point of time.

He has aroused anger and hurt northern sentiment on the one hand. Eastern Tamil opinion too is worried and unhappy about Karuna’s moves to hitch his wagon to the Sinhala star. Reports of trying to join a future government can only trouble Tamil feelings further. Karuna can ignore this reality only to his cost.

Karuna, the eastern LTTE commander for 17 long years, cannot feign ignorance of recent history. State oppression has been brutal and bloody in the east. The violence unleashed on the eastern Tamils by the predominantly Sinhala armed forces aided at times by Muslim home guards made them rely more on the strength provided by the north. This was more of a state of mind at times .

Heightened tension

The Tamil – Muslim tensions exacerbated these feelings further. While decades of war impoverished and enfeebled the Tamils in general, the Muslim community identifying itself with governments in power and enjoying patronage politics were empowered more in comparison with Tamils.

Furthermore colonisation of the east as well as outward migration caused by war had reduced the Tamil presence in the province further. In 1921 the Tamils were 56%, Muslims 40% and Sinhalese four percent in the province; the 1981 census had 42% Tamils, 33% Muslims and 25% Sinhalese. According to the latest projections (minus counts in Tamil dominated uncleared areas), the Muslims are 40%, Tamils 34% and Sinhalese 26%.

Thus the average eastern Tamil who was at one time the dominant numerical entity in the east now feels that he or she is a minority in the region. There is also the underlying fear that the Sinhala and Muslim communities would gang up against the Tamil people of the province.

This sense of insecurity felt by the eastern Tamils was an important motivating factor behind the Tamil homeland demand. The east was seen as an integral part of the Tamil linguistic region or traditional homeland or area of historic habitation.

By linking up with northern Tamils in a greater north – eastern province the Batticaloa Tamils felt more secure. Given the very important role played by eastern Tamils in the politics of moderate as well as militant Tamil organisations the wishes of the east could not be ignored or overridden.

Moreover the brutal ferocity of the Sri Lankan state in trying to crush Tamil militancy in the province left in its wake a beaten and battered people and a virtual ‘scorched earth.’

Against that backdrop it would have been a gross betrayal for anyone to even suggest that the north and east should be linked and that the people of both provinces should be allowed to charter their own political course.

Emotive issue

The post – Thimhu phase of Tamil politics has in a practical sense been a search for greater autonomy. This search for the most part emphasised the unit rather than substance of devolution. Opposition to greater autonomy too has been based more on grounds of unit than powers.

The north – east merger has been a highly emotive issue. There could be no compromise on it. Opting for a de – merger was tantamount to betraying eastern Tamils it was felt.

Today, thesacred cow known as the north – east merger has been wounded if not slaughtered. From a northern perspective it is a deeply distressing feeling of hurt as the demand for de – merger comes not from elsewhere but from the heart of eastern Tiger land.

Karuna has now objected to northern hegemony in the form of north – east merger. The eastern Tamil voice has been added to those of Sinhala and Muslim voices arguing against a merger. This from a northern perspective is the unkindest cut of all.

It was Karuna and his band of eastern Tigers who fought the battles of Jayasikuru and Oyatha Alaigal on northern soil and earned the respect and gratitude of all Tamils at one point of time.

Unfortunately due to bizarre circumstances the very same Karuna has now raised the cry of regional revolt. Whatever the causes for his action there is no doubt that he has touched a raw nerve.

Karuna was perhaps the most inspiring example of the ‘new’ Tamils who is seemingly beyond considerations of caste, religion and region and worships only at the shrine of Tamil Eelam nationalism.

When he raises the regional cry it may strike a ‘limited’ responsive chord in the region. But the overall effect can only be to bewilder and sadden Tamils at large. There is no enthusiasm in the east for Karuna to go this far in his fight with the leadership.

Greater support

He could have enjoyed greater support if he had opted to fight for greater autonomy within the LTTE and accepting Pirapaharan’s leadership without threatening to split north – eastern unity.

The need of the hour is for saner and wiser counsel to prevail on all sides. The Karuna rebellion if allowed to run its course without any effort at reconciliation can only result in weakening the LTTE and by extension the Tamils. A statesmanlike approach is necessary.

Unfortunately the myriad voices raised in support of the LTTE and Velupillai Pirapaharan generate more heat than light. There is unequivocal condemnation of Karuna. He is depicted as a traitor. His act is perceived as treason.This is not conducive for rapprochement.

The London based Tamil Guardian in an editorial spoke about the crisis as one between ‘brothers’ and advocated rapprochement. This initial response was commendable. Subsequently the journal altered its position.

Amidst the cacophony of voices condemning Karuna, voices calling for a balanced and moderate approach are inaudible.

Cost of peace

What is of paramount importance is that the wishes of the eastern Tamil people should be respected. The people would like peace but not at the cost of fratricidal conflict or rupture of north – eastern unity.

If the people want peace, security and prosperity neither the LTTEnor Karuna should impose war on them again. Also if the eastern people do not want brother to fight brother then those wishes should be adhered to.

As TULF ex Amparai District Parliamentarian, Chandranehru Ariyana- yagam stated the eastern Tamil people think of ‘Praba and Karuna as their right and left eye.’None are so blind as those who have eyesight but will not see.

The internal squabbles of the LTTE should not be allowed to drive a deep wedge between the northern and eastern Tamils. Extraneous forces should not be allowed to exploit the situation and ultimately manipulate Karuna.

There is a saying in Tamil about the saree getting entangled in thorns needing to be retrieved carefully. It does not matter whether the saree fell on the thorns or the thorn pierced the saree. Unless it is retrieved carefully it is the saree that will get damaged.

Likewise broader Tamil nationalism is at a critical stage today. Karuna cannot fight both the LTTE and the government simultaneously. He has to make peace with one party.

If the LTTE continues to treat him as the ‘sole’ enemy then Karuna will have no choice other than to throw in his lot with Colombo.

If that happens the military equilibrium will be transformed. If Colombo can secure a peaceful eastern front and neutralise Karuna then Wanni will be at a distinct disadvantage. Colombo will be strengthened further.

If the LTTE continues to be hostile to Karuna and engages in armed action, then Karuna would be forced to align himself with the armed forces to protect himself.

Karuna has a large number of cadres with him. Hecontrols territory. He enjoys the sympathetic support of significant sections of eastern society. Given an external input and logistical assistance Karuna could prove to be an eastern thorn in Tiger flesh.

At best he could be a powerful warlord like Afghanistan’s Rasheed Dostom. At worst he could be the leader of another ex – Tamil militant group fighting alongside the army. There are enough of such outfits in the east already like the PLOTE Mohan Group, EPRLF Razeek Group and TELO Varathan Group.

Swift strike

At present the LTTE is trying to gradually diminish his support and wean away cadres. If and when he is weakened the LTTE will strike. The Tigers will always be on the lookout to launch a swift surgical strike to eliminate him – commando type raid or a covert assassination. If these methods do not succeed there could be an open conflagration at some time.

Whatever the outcome of this confrontation, the LTTE will be weakened. Even if killed Karuna will be a martyr to the east.

A fratricidal conflict where eastern Tiger fights Nothern Tiger will not be relished. Such a conflict will scar the eastern psyche forever.

Consequentially north – east feelings will be ruptured. The north – eastern merger will be lost.

Even if the LTTE installs a puppet Tiger regime manned by eastern quislings, it would not carry much weight with the Batticaloa people. Resentment will always be there.

The LTTE could never again be the fighting machine that it was in the east in particular and Sri Lanka in general.

One silver lining in this gloomy scenario is the current mediatory efforts of intellectuals and professionals from Batticaloa to resolve the situation.

Some of these people were initially supportive of Karuna but realise now the consequences of his action and want to help stabilise the situation.

Even at this late stage there is some chance for reunion if the LTTE hierarchy in Kilinochchi genuinely extends a hand of forgiving friendship.

Karuna too should refrain from escalating tensions further and seek a compromise. Conflict should be avoided and a settlement reached.

Such a compromise should radically reorganise the LTTE administrative machinery. The eastern region should be given extensive autonomy.

Karuna could be given a genuine guarantee of safety and allowed to retire with ‘dignity.’ He should not be labelled a traitor and treated as such.

This may be very hard for the LTTE hierarchy given its pride and sense of self – righteousness, but it is a bitter pill to swallow in the interests of the Tamil people and the movement.

If the Tigers and renegades remain inflexible and pursue a confrontational course it is the Tamil cause that would suffer irredeemable harm in the future.