By Dr Palitha Kohona

Sri Lanka is a rare case where a brutal terrorist challenge to the state was comprehensively defeated, substantially through its own efforts, despite all the advice, reservations and fears publicly expressed to the contrary. Unfortunately, the elimination of terrorism has won it few plaudits internationally. Instead, the tables have been turned and the military success of the Sri Lankan state and its security forces is overshadowed by extensive accusations relating to alleged violations of the norms of war and of human rights. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who led the country to free it of the terrorist challenge, has been accused of not giving negotiations a chance. I will address only this allegation in this overview. Curiously, the terrorist group, the LTTE, which savagely terrorised the population for over 27 years, is hardly mentioned while accusations of gross violations by the security forces dominate the headlines and the state is made to feel guilty of wrongdoing.

Analysts have sought to identify the reasons for this strangely illogical outcome. At the time that President Rajapaksa was elected, many, including senior officials of Sri Lanka, believed that the once feared LTTE could not be defeated militarily. Additionally, the then Opposition was publicly skeptical of the government’s ability to overcome the LTTE. The comments of a senior opposition member of Parliament that the soldiers went to Pamankada (a suburb of Colombo) but claimed to have gone to Alimankada (Elephant Pass in the North) reflected this skepticism. In 2006, the Chief of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) General Henrickson advised Sri Lankan officials at the highest levels, including the Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat, not to entertain any thoughts of confronting the LTTE militarily as the terrorist group was far too good, too professional and better motivated compared with the security forces and its leadership and would prevail in the event of a confrontation Similar warnings were voiced by many heads of Western Diplomatic Missions based in Colombo, despite their own publicly proclaimed anti-terrorist policies and military actions designed to destroy terrorists far from their own borders, including in the South Asian neighbourhood. Either through pragmatism, desperation founded on experience, or for other reasons best known to themselves, many advocated continued negotiations with the LTTE despite the fact that the multiple efforts to end the conflict through negotiations since 1985, including with Indian intervention, and despite the many concessions made by different elected presidents, had failed.

In fact, it was patent that negotiations had only helped the LTTE to regroup, re-arm and launch fresh assaults with greater ferocity. Some prominent countries represented in Colombo, such as Russia, China and France, did not belong to the group that advocated continued negotiations, perhaps reflecting their own experiences with terrorism and their views on dealing with challenges to national sovereignty.

It is likely that the LTTE and its leader, Prabhakaran, believed in Ho Chi Minh’s dictum, “talk talk and fight fight” and talking was just part of a strategy to create breathing space to regroup and consolidate before striking harder. They were encouraged to believe in their own invincibility by a dedicated and well- resourced following of expatriates some of whom were millionaires, a range of international NGOs based in the West and who hobnobbed with Western diplomatic missions in Colombo, some members of the IGO community and prominent members of Western diplomatic community in Colombo. This was despite the emerging consensus in the West, particularly since the events of 9/11 that there will be no accommodation with terrorism. (Today, this approach has been taken further and even terrorist supporters are eliminated in distant lands before they have had the opportunity to engage in acts of terror). It is possible that a combination of these factors gave rise to the perception that the conflict could be ended only through negotiations (even though it was patently obvious that the LTTE did not want such an end) and when this script was not followed, many attempted to attribute the outcome to gross abuses. It is also speculated that the LTTE ensured the victory of Rajapaksa at the November 2005 elections in the hope that he could be provoked in to a conflict in which his military would be defeated.

Could it be stated that President Rajapaksa, elected to office in November 2005, preferred to settle the terrorist problem through war without giving negotiations a chance. The reality could not be further from the truth. Rajapaksa, who had a deep seated and undisguised attachment to parliamentary institutions, took the critical decision to pursue the military option against the LTTE only after the LTTE itself had scuttled three efforts in 2006 to end the conflict through negotiations. The keenness of the Lankan state to pursue negotiations could be gauged from the fact that a team from Harvard was brought down to train its negotiating team which was headed by the leader of the House, Nimal Siripala de Silva. The writer himself was invited to return home to join the negotiating team, giving up a senior legal post at the United Nations headquarters in New York.

Furthermore, few were aware that the military leadership was uncertain of its own capabilities, after having suffered a series of disastrous setbacks in the previous 10 years. The equipment level of the military was inadequate; some senior elements of the military themselves did not believe in the possibility of a military victory and openly said so and a general lack of confidence had seeped in to the psyche of the people encouraged by a negative attitude disseminated by elements of the political leadership and the well resourced NGO community. The peace mantra was being chanted prolifically in the South while terrorist bombs were exploding at regular intervals killing dozens of non combatants and service personnel. There was growing doubt among the majority of the population as to whether the motive of the peace brigade was to demoralize the security forces. Conscious of these factors, Rajapaksa initially sought a negotiated end to the conflict.

Following the election Rajapaksa as president, the LTTE attacks on military personnel and civilians and on government naval vessels intensified. The government responded by putting increasing pressure on the Norwegians, in particular special peace envoy Erik Solheim, to get the two parties together for talks. Rajapaksa believed that there was room for negotiations and compromise. Norwegian and European arm-twisting seemed to produce results. Despite initial disagreements on the location of the talks, in February 2006, following extensive consultations involving Solheim, the government team led by the Leader of the House, Nimal Siripala de Silva, met the LTTE team led by Anton Balasingham in Geneva at a chalet in Celigny provided by the Swiss. The Norwegians were there represented by Erik Solheim, Hans Bratskar et al. In addition to the ailing Balasingham, the LTTE team included the its Political Leader and Secretary General of the LTTE Peace Secretariat established under the Cease Fire Agreement, (Thamil Selvam and Pulidevan), its Police Chief, Nadesan (whose wife was a Sinhalese), their propaganda chief, Daya Master and Balasingham’s wife, the Australian Adele. The opportunities for social interaction between the two delegations, orchestrated by the Norwegians, provided a glimpse in to the thinking of individual members of the LTTE delegation. Balasingham, who knew that he had only a short while to live, was keen to bring the long drawn out conflict to an end but on a successful note for himself and for the LTTE. Adele had little to say but appeared to be focused on Balasingham’s health. Daya Master, the propaganda chief, dreamed of going to Australia to live with his daughter.

At the end of the first day, Balasingham, lived up to his reputation as a bully by threatening to walk away from the negotiations unless the government delegation agreed at least, in principle, to the main LTTE demands, including the recognition of a separate Tamil homeland in the North-East with the LTTE in charge of this entity at least for an agreed period. (Balasingham had completely overawed previous government delegations which he confronted in 2002 and 2003 with his domineering style). There was momentary panic in the government ranks at the prospect of the talks collapsing unless Balasingham’s demands were met. He clearly overplayed his hand. After some internal discussions and in consultation with the government leadership in Colombo, it was decided to reject Balasingham’s immediate demands but further explore options for compromise.

I strongly suggested that Balasingham’s bluff be called as he himself could not go back to his Norwegian benefactors or to the European sympathisers after having wrecked the talks. The following morning Nimal Siripala de Silva took the floor and calmly said that the government remained committed to continuing the talks to find a compromise but as a democratically elected government responsible to its voters was unable to concede Balasingham’s arbitrary demands. While the atmosphere remained electric for a short while, as the government delegation sat silently uncertain about Balasingham’s reaction, the LTTE delegation retired for consultations. A little while later Balasingham returned to the table, with much of his puffed up bravado gone, and meekly agreed to continue with the talks. The LTTE was also forced to concede for the first time that it would not recruit children for combat purposes any further.

After two days, the talks ended on a relatively high note with a commitment to reconvene two months later, at the end of April, 2006. The Government delegation returned home in high spirits. Nevertheless, some of us remained suspicious whether the LTTE, given its track record, would remain faithful to this commitment. We were also beginning to hear through reliable sources that Prabhakaran was very unhappy with his negotiating team.

As if to underline his displeasure, Prabhakaran unleashed a string of suicide bombers and deployed half a dozen claymore mines causing massive carnage in the south. All apparently designed to demoralise the government and/or provoke a civilian backlash which could then be used to help with recruitment and for propaganda purposes. Hundreds of soldiers and civilians were slaughtered during this murderous campaign, but no civilian backlash occurred. The government also restrained itself and continued to pursue the negotiations option. However, it was becoming increasingly difficult for a democratically elected government to continue without responding. It was also becoming clear to the dismay of LTTE strategists that the sense of maturity and discipline among the civilians would continue. (To be continued tomorrow)

On April 25, General Sarath Fonseka, the Commander of the Army, was targeted by a pregnant suicide bomber who had managed to infiltrate the military hospital compound in Colombo. He barely managed to survive and had to be airlifted to Singapore later for treatment. (He survived and led the military to its final victory). Sixteen of his body guards and bystanders were killed. With panic and fear spreading among leaders and the population alike and serious questions being asked of the usefulness of negotiations with the LTTE, I was asked to go before the TV cameras and explain the government position, and this appearance was to be followed by regular such appearances before the media, mainly the international media, over the next three years. The proscription of the LTTE by the EU which happened soon thereafter caused the LTTE to demand the withdrawal of EU members attached to the SLMM. This was followed by an outrageous atrocity when the LTTE exploded two claymore mines targeting a packed civilian bus in Kabilitigollawa. The dead exceeded 70, including pregnant women going to attend their weekly clinic. The attack on General Parami Kulatunga, Deputy Chief of Staff, killing him, caused even the SLMM to question the usefulness of the cease fire agreement. The seriousness of the LTTE in seeking a negotiated end to the conflict was very much in doubt.

A US study made available to the government of Sri Lanka at the time suggested that the LTTE would seek to take over Trincomalee which was of seminal strategic importance and was the hub from which the Jaffna peninsula was resupplied. The land route was no longer useable by the security forces. The LTTE having infiltrated and consolidated itself in the southern part of the bay, the government also set about taking necessary steps to quietly strengthen Trincomalee.

The government and its Peace Secretariat still persisted in the hope of resuming discussions with the LTTE in April or even later. For its part, active preparations continued.

With demands for the April talks being made by the Government, the LTTE asked that its Eastern leaders be permitted to consult with the Northern leadership prior to the negotiations and that they be transported in a government military helicopter. The military refused to oblige for fear of risking the safety of its helicopters. Every alternative offer made by the Government Peace Secretariat to provide transportation to the Eastern leaders to travel to the North, including by ferry, chartered helicopter and by seaplane, was rebuffed by an over-confident LTTE. The Eastern contingent once boarded the ferry provided but refused to undertake the voyage. A large chartered helicopter brought across from South Africa at great expense by Decan Air, was not used. The sea plane that was brought over from the Maldives and was flown by a Canadian pilot remained idle for weeks. The talks that the government delegation so enthusiastically anticipated, never happened.

However, the government Peace Secretariat continued to maintaining links with the Norwegian peace facilitator, by now, Jon Hansson Bauer (playfully referred to as Handsombua by the then Foreign Minister, Samaraweera). Jon Hansson Bauer asked for a private meeting with me away from the public glare to work out possible options for another round of talks with the LTTE. We agreed to meet somewhere that the local media would not notice and the LTTE would not be able to observe us. All major capitals of Europe were ruled out. Eventually we agreed to meet secretly in Barcelona where there was hardly a Sri Lankan, especially a Tamil, community. Over two days of discussions, we agreed to restart the talks, perhaps talks about the talks, at a lower level.

A Government delegation led by me, as the Secretary-General of the Peace Secretariat, went to Oslo on the invitation of the Norwegians in June 2006. A LTTE delegation led by Thamilselvam was flown to Oslo by the Norwegians. Curiously, the legal advisor of the LTTE team was the former Chief Justice of Sri Lanka, Shiva Pasupathi. Someone mischievously observed that the Tamils could not have been that marginalised if they could have advanced to so high a position in the judicial field in Sri Lanka. Even more curiously, Shiva Pasupathi preferred to sit with the government delegates at dinner and not with his own team. The two delegations stayed in the same hotel, dined in the same room but the LTTE just refused to come to the negotiating table. The LTTE delegation, instead spent the day playing with a frisbee on the lawn outside while the government delegation sat at the negotiating table. All efforts, including by Jon Hansson Bauer, to get the LTTE delegation to come to the table failed. There was suspicion among us that Thamilselvam came to Europe with Norwegian funding, not to engage in talks with the government delegation but to meet with LTTE leaders in Europe to brief them on the next phase of their campaign and to collect funds. It took a persistent effort on the part of the Government delegation at the end of the day to get Erik Solheim to issue a statement blaming the LTTE delegation for the talks not happening. He would have been happy to let the LTTE off the hook with no consequences for their determined effort to wreck the talks. The government delegation left Oslo that evening and returned home via London. Interestingly, Shiva Pasupathi sat next to me on the way to London (he was going on to Australia, his adopted home) and was full of disappointment that the talks did not occur.

During this period, while the government of President Rajapaksa was making every effort to engage the LTTE in a dialogue, Prabhakaran appears to have had other plans. In July, the LTTE, in an unprecedented provocative move, cut off the water supply to 65,000 farming people in the Eastern Province by occupying the Mavil Aru, which is located in the Trincomalee District. The government Peace Secretariat intervened directly with the LTTE through the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission to get them to release the water as thousands of acres of paddy were beginning to wilt in the heat. The LTTE Peace Secretariat and its political wing leader Thamilselvam kept floating ideas and eventually suggested constructing a water tower to provide an equal amount of water to Tamil residents of the area. This was not a serious proposition as water for agriculture was traditionally supplied via canals and not by using a tower. The toing and froing continued until the government decided to resolve the impasse by force. A battalion of troops had to be secretly brought down from Jaffna as the government lacked troops for the operation. General Henrikson, commander of the SLMM, after having failed to convince the LTTE that they were seriously in breach of the Cease Fire Agreement by occupying Mavil Aru, suddenly got himself in to the battle zone to monitor the breaches of the Agreement by the security forces. He suggested, almost farcically, that the government by not discussing the conditions conveyed to him by the LTTE, was in breach of the ceasefire agreement. The government saw no reason to bargain on the basis of a public utility which had up to the occupation by the LTTE served the people adequately. After 10 days of difficult fighting, the LTTE combatants were forcibly evicted by the Security Forces. The campaign was short, but bloody.

This provocation was followed by massive attacks by the LTTE on Security Forces positions, in Trincomalee, Sampur to the south of Tricomalee and Jaffna and the forcible eviction of over 54,000 Muslims from Muttur. The scenario outlined in the assessment of the US team with regard to Trincomalee was being enacted in reality. In the days prior to the attacks, leaflets were circulated in Muttur, a predominantly Muslim town, demanding that the Muslims leave. In a brazen breach of the CFA, the LTTE landed heavily armed men on the beaches of Muttur and quickly overran the naval detachment located there and shortly thereafter, the police post also withdrew. The civilians, mostly Muslims, fled en mass along the Kanthale Road. Some perishing at the hands of gun happy LTTE cadres; others being executed for collaborating with the security forces. The Ticomalee harbour was shelled from Sampur across the bay, with artillery with no regard for possible civilian casualties. Three army camps to the south of Trincomalee were attacked, including with heavy weapons.

Despite the ferocity of the attacks, the camps remained in government hands, putting the LTTE on notice that the soldiers were now willing to hold their ground and fight. A different and more determined attitude was beginning to manifest in the security forces. A massive bombardment took place across the Muhamalai line in the North and that defence line also held.

The security forces counter attacked and relieved Muttur. During this fighting, 17 volunteers with the ACF (Action Against Hunger) had defied evacuation orders and remained in their compound. Their dead bodies with bullet wounds were discovered when Muttur was relieved. However, the ACF deaths, which were subjected to an ongoing investigation by the police and by a magistrate, continued to be played up by the LTTE propaganda machine and doubts cast on the security forces. My deputy in the Peace Secretariat, Kethish Loganathan, a Tamil, was murdered on his own doorstep by the LTTE on 12 August 2006.

After expelling the LTTE from Sampur, the security forces continued to fight their way through the Eastern Province until all LTTE strong points were taken. When the security forces successfully cleared Sampur, reflecting the strong inclination of the Western media to reflect LTTE propaganda lines without verification, Dumita Luthra of the BBC ran a heart rending story of 41,000 civilians being uprooted by the security forces operation. She was forced to retract the story when the government Peace Secretariat demonstrated that there were only less than 16,000 civilians in the entire Sampur area and most of them, in fact, had remained in their homes.

The ceasefire agreement of 2002 was now reduced to a piece of paper. The government urgently, almost in panic, asked the Norwegians, Erik Solheim, to get the peace talks restarted. The inclination of President Rajapaksa still was to talk to the LTTE. In response, Jon Hanssen Bauer arrived in Sri Lanka. The Norwegians may have judged that the parity of status between the LTTE and the government which they had advocated for serious negotiations to begin, may have arrived.

Against this background, the next round of talks were convened in Geneva in October by the Norwegians. They were essentially scuttled by the LTTE walking out after a day and a morning, making impossible demands, including the reopening of the main road to Jaffna, the A9.

It was against this background of three failed attempts to engage the LTTE in talks and continuing large scale assaults on the security forces and civilians using murderous IEDs, that the Government of President Rajapaksa opted to deploy the military in strength against the LTTE. Many observers believe that Rajapaksa had been ready to make major concessions within the context of a unitary state to achieve a negotiated end to the conflict. Despite what he has been portrayed to be, a leader bent on using force, he possessed a strong underlying sense of fair play and humanity. In this respect, the blame for not encouraging Prabhakaran also to seek a solution for any grievances of the Northern Tamils instead of seeking to recreate a Tamil kingdom through violence, terrorism and war must be shared by the Norwegians, Solheim included, who enjoyed his trust, the European and other sympsthisers, including funders providing endless resources to him. Not much effort appears to have been made to correct Prabhakaran’s myth obsessed aspirations by those enjoying his trust and confidence. So many more lives, both of the security forces and of civilians, could have been saved and the country would have advanced much more, economically, socially and politically.

Courtesy:The Island