by

Kalana Senaratne

Some wondered whether the recent visit of Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa’s Deputy President, amounted to unwarranted intervention. Some thought he was a mediator. For some others, he was just a tourist. Minister Wimal Weerawansa informed the Lankadeepa newspaper that there was no problem in Ramaphosa having a cup of tea or watching a cricket match.

Deputy President of South Africa in Jaffna-July 8, 2014-pic courtesy of: Northern Provincial Council

Finally the government, through the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, sought to assure the Opposition and the people that there is nothing to worry; that South Africa will not act as mediator in the Sri Lankan conflict; that Ramaphosa was here to share his views about truth and reconciliation. For President Rajapaksa had wanted to ascertain what lessons, if any, could be taken from the famous Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process in South Africa (Colombo Gazette, July 10, 2014). As you know, there is a great thirst for knowledge about matters concerning TRCs.

The Sri Lankan leadership thrives precisely on generating confusion; some-thing is happening, some other things are not happening, every one knows what’s happening, and yet no one knows what’s actually happening. So it’s necessary to explore, to expose, what appears to be happening here, and there are enough reasons to be wary about this new Ramaphosa-phase of the Sri Lankan conflict. One has no problems with strategic political/diplomatic moves that lead to greater justice, peace and reconciliation. But this one, of getting South Africa involved, is a move which appears to be dubious from the start. Why so?

Firstly, the main practical motive animating the government (in getting South Africa’s involvement) appears to be the need to neutralize the Indian factor. India, as we learn from media reports, will be duly briefed of developments; but from now, India may not be the sole power that sets the rules. This is in addition to the depleted influence that Tamil Nadu can exert on Prime Minister Modi’s government. And with South Africa in the picture, Indian pressure can now be portrayed as obstructing the convivial and measured process facilitated by South Africa. Whether Ramaphosa, a skilled and able negotiator, will go along with this game-plan is to be seen.

Secondly, Ramaphosa’s involvement provides time and space for the government to procrastinate. The South African approach is less interventionist than the Indian one. And that is ideal for a government which needs time and space, when faced with an international probe; especially because it is unable, both practically and from an ideological perspective, to address the issue of accountability or to introduce far-reaching constitutional reform. South Africa now gets converted into a buffer.

Why this skeptical view about South Africa’s involvement (or about Sri Lanka’s interest in getting South Africa involved)? This has to do with the broad purposes of such involvement, two of which are: to explore the possibility of establishing a South African style TRC; and to introduce constitutional reform to address the conflict (as reported in Xinhuanet).

The problem with the first purpose is that of intention: what does the government intend to do by establishing a TRC? If the intention here is to avoid accountability (which is the case), then the Ramaphosa-process might drag on meaninglessly, or Ramaphosa would just end up helping the government to legitimize impunity, unwittingly.

Some reports suggest that when questioned by the Northern Chief Minister Justice CV Wigneswaran, Ramaphosa had stated that in helping the Sri Lankan Government to establish a TRC process, he is only seeking to complement the ongoing international probe (as reported in the Daily FT). But for a TRC to be a genuinely complementary mechanism, the government should either hold a credible domestic investigation, or engage with the international probe. A TRC doesn’t become complementary within a vacuum; further raising the need for Ramaphosa to inform whether Sri Lanka should establish a credible inquiry process, or whether she should engage with the international probe.

Furthermore, when talking about TRCs, there is another factor that Ramaphosa would need to keep in mind. When the LLRC was established, a popular view promoted by the government was that the LLRC was a result of a careful study of international best practices, that the LLRC was Sri Lanka’s own home-grown version of the South African TRC. Ramaphosa, one hopes, is aware of the implications of this narrative: that the government deliberately misled the people (and international actors) when it established the LLRC; or that it is deliberately misleading the people now by talking about a new South African-style TRC, as if nothing of that sort was even studied before.

The second overarching purpose of Ramaphosa’s involvement, we are told, is to assist in introducing constitutional reform to address the ethnic conflict. But the initial question to be posed to the government here is: cannot a government, if it is truly committed to constitutional reform (and if it is seriously concerned about international interference), initiate such a process without the assistance of any international actor? That Sri Lanka gets South Africa involved in something that Sri Lanka can do by herself (at least, theoretically) makes it clear that South African involvement is sought for ulterior purposes listed above.

Here again, what the government really wants is not exactly constitutional reform. Rather, the government’s greater desire is to get Ramaphosa to persuade the TNA to join the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC), which is supposedly the body that will formulate the political solution to the conflict. This becomes somewhat clear from what the Deputy Minister stated in Parliament about the discussions on reconciliation which were held with Ramaphosa: “For the success of such a domestic reconciliation process, the imperative need of all stakeholders participating in the Parliamentary Select Committee required to be discussed as well.” For these days, all roads lead to the PSC.

But Ramaphosa’s success would lie, not in getting the TNA to join the PSC (which will have no bearing on the outcome of the PSC, which Ramaphosa would know having examined the history of the Sri Lankan conflict), but in getting the government to negotiate and agree on a political solution with the TNA, one which provides for serious structural reform of the state and greater autonomy, within a specific time period.

In short, one would say that it’s too early to predict the fate of this new phase of the Sri Lankan conflict. But a government which is committed to peace and reconciliation would act differently, without getting international actors further involved in an already internationalized problem.

Ironically, however, South Africa’s engagement not only proves that there is no end to international involvement, but also that some form of solution to the conflict will only come with greater international involvement and diplomatic pressure. Perhaps Ramaphosa would be aware of that. For now, what we know is that there will be many more visits and discussions; and it will be quite an achievement if all this ultimately amounts to much more than having a cup of tea with Cyril Ramaphosa.

Courtesy:The Nation