By

Kalana Senaratne

It has been clear for some time now that the positions adopted by the present regime and the UNP on the issue of accountability are somewhat similar in their ultimate effect; for fundamentally, the UNP does not critique the armed forces.

We know that it is only a critique of the armed forces, or greater suspicion of its actions, that could bring some dissimilarity between the positions adopted by the regime and the UNP.

Until that happens, the task of any mainstream party would be to engage in proposing strategic moves to address what are considered to be diplomatic blunders, with a sprinkling of mild reforms here and there.

This is the task that the UNP is engaged in; and it is symptomatic of the challenge that the Rajapaksa regime has posed since the end of the war in 2009. Stated differently, with the end of the war, one of UNP’s main political challenges has been one of re-branding. How does the UNP re-brand itself as a nationalist party to attract the majority? On this controversial topic of accountability, the main question for the UNP is: what is the ‘smart’ and ‘sophisticated’ way of avoiding an international investigation (i.e. the precise thing the regime wants to do)? The question can be rephrased in less-generous terms: how do you legitimize the anti-accountability stance of the regime?

Most recently, the UNP sought to make its position clear on the UNHRC-sanctioned international probe by stating what it considers to be the best, alternative, approach. As briefly discussed in this column last week, this came about in the form of an amendment proposed by the UNP to the Parliamentary motion on the probe. Interestingly, that position was explained most recently by Ranil Wickremesinghe, in the Newsfirst ‘Face to Face’ interview. His responses signaled that what the UNP seeks to do is to legitimize the dominant approach adopted by the present regime. How so?

When questioned on the challenges pertaining to the proposed international probe, one of Wickremesinghe’s main arguments was that it was wrong for the President to sign the Joint Communiqué with the visiting UNSG Ban Ki-Moon in 2009 and agree to an investigation, and that it was equally wrong to engage with the Darusman-Panel in the way it did.

Now, it is unclear how vociferously opposed the UNP was to these developments at the time they occurred. It is equally unclear to me how the specific words of the Joint Communiqué can be interpreted to mean that President Rajapaksa made an unambiguous commitment to investigate. But in developing such a critique, Wickremasinghe seeks to project the UNP’s solution on a strongly nationalist (read Sinhala nationalist) platform.

Wickremesinghe then operates within this broad framework, which he imagines is a challenge to the nationalist credentials of the regime. He doesn’t really realize that the regime has set the trap, laid down the rules, and that the UNP is only reacting, having agreed to play within the limits set by the regime. What happens?

Wickremesinghe proceeds to make a very valid point that the regime should not have stuck to its absurd ‘zero-civilian casualties’ argument. But now comes the reason (this is where Wickremesinghe glimpses the trap): it’s not because the armed forces killed civilians; rather, it’s because the LTTE killed civilians. While one cannot disagree with the fact that the LTTE killed civilians, the problem with this argument is that this always diminishes the force that the UNP thinks its critique has, when critiquing the present regime on the issue of accountability.

When your analysis flows from the fundamental belief that the LTTE is to be blamed for much or most of what happened, what also happens is that the investigation of armed forces becomes a matter that needs to be addressed only to revive the good name of the armed forces. Hardly realized is the fact that in the final analysis, this is to play right into the hands of the regime; from now on, one moves ever so slowly towards a ‘solution’ that even the regime would not complain about (in private).

And what’s this solution? Wickremesinghe states (repeating in effect the position set out by the UNP in Parliament) that this solution lies in developing Sri Lanka’s own independent mechanisms (and therefore, re-introducing the 17th Amendment), in implementing the LLRC recommendations, and in introducing right to information legislation.

One principal weakness in this position is that it seeks to de-problematize the days of the 17th Amendment. It is as if everything was fine when the 17th Amendment was in place. Also, the UNP is not so clear whether having established these institutions Sri Lanka should proceed to investigate the Sri Lankan armed forces, and if so, what incidents it thinks should be investigated, or whether it thinks that a comprehensive investigation into the 2002-2009 period should take place. Furthermore, while independent and vibrant institutions are indeed needed, this uncritical attachment to the 17th Amendment, one feels, simplifies the complex functioning and underlying prejudices of many of the state-institutions and structures that are related to ensuring justice and accountability.

The second weakness is to rely too much on the LLRC recommendations on accountability. As has been argued elsewhere, a careful reading of the LLRC report would show that in broad terms, the LLRC is not convincing in its critique of the major war-time policies of the government. And we sense this, when a commissioner of the LLRC ends up thereafter as Sri Lanka’s representative in Paris.

The third weakness of the position set out by Wickremesinghe (and the UNP) is the suggestion that the right to information legislation will enable the people to learn more about what happened during the war. While such legislation is necessary, even a cursory study of right to information jurisprudence will suggest that the fundamental concern with such legislation is the proclivity on the part of the State to withhold information on grounds of national security. And what is unbelievable about the unp’s position is its belief that such legislation in Sri Lanka might enable citizens greater access to any controversial documentation pertaining to the war and war-time policy decisions!

The UNP’s magic solution, therefore, further exposes the complexity of the problem. It is a reflection of the helplessness of the mainstream opposition that is stuck between an international investigation and domestic elections. It also reflects how the Rajapaksa- regime’s overarching policy can be legitimized with a few policy ‘reforms’. It is quite the same thing, in a different, more attractive, garb.

Finally, in realizing that the UNP’s solution is simply a ‘sophisticated’ version of the Rajapaksa-regime’s approach, any support for the UNP’s solution by the ‘international community’ will show that the ‘international community’ is only concerned about regime change, not about justice and accountability. And that will help the present regime too.

The UNP’s solution, like that of the regime, is part of a small recycling process, not one of radical change.

Courtesy:The Nation