by Bandu de Silva
The Indian domestic political system is in deep trouble despite the country making great headway in other directions, such as gaining nuclear power status and its overall economy about to make a big leap into the world of leading economic giants, competing with China. The trouble is how to keep India’s domestic political system under control with the supremacy of the Union at the centre.
This premise can fail if, as Paran Chopra, leading Indian analyst commenting on Indian interests in St. Gilan principles, emphasized, India does not examine the issue of whether the appeal of federalism, and particularly of its parliamentary variety, will become weaker or stronger if a federation’s claim to sovereignty is held to be a more qualified one than that of a unitary state, and if the parliamentary form became a laboratory for experimenting with the deflation of its sovereignty, through the conferment of diplomatic roles upon its constituents and penetration of boundaries – (The Hindu).
In other words, if India considers constituent states of the Indian Union have a right to penetrate the boundaries and assert roles in directing policies at the Centre, however much they may clash with India’s overall foreign policy and bi-lateral policies towards neighbouring countries.
Chopra saw the process of application of St. Gilan principles taking place already in the Indian context. Writing in The Hindu, reflecting on the St. Gilan principles and their impact on foreign policy making by devolved units on which he was commenting to underline that it was very much a contemporary issue, he quoted the instance ‘where the Federal Government (of India) has actively sought the support of the neighbouring constituent (State), in fact, has depended on it, in framing and implementing its policy towards that neighbour.” (The reference obviously was to Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka). What does this point to, except an indication of collusion (or is it virtual submission?) on the part of New Delhi to Tamil Nadu playing a pro-active role in Sri Lankan Tamil politics, as perceived by the leading Indian analyst.
The observations made by Chopra arise not only from the historical situation against which the Indian federation was put together, but also because of other developments, which have been taking place in the constituent units that he tries to see in the light of St. Gilan principles. For example, through ‘deflation of its (Union’s) sovereignty through the conferment of diplomatic roles upon its constituents and penetration of boundaries’ which Chopra referred to.
Tamil Nadu with its over 70 million population, which is far more than the population of many countries in Europe, Africa and Asia and its mono-linguistic and ethnic characteristics is an entity to be reckoned with. Also to be reckoned with is its economic performance, which ranks higher than that of most other Indian states, as much as the fact that the ruling Congress has come to depend on Tamil Nadu for a big slice of its electoral support. All these factors have given this particular state far more political clout to direct policy in New Delhi, which is a situation that no other constituent state enjoys.
To explain the point, Tamil Nadu was directing policy in New Delhi since the end of the 1970s, since Sri Lankan Tamil politics took a violent form. There is no evidence that there was a strong pro-Sri Lankan Tamil sentiment in Tamil Nadu before that. The only visible link was between smugglers of goods and humans from South India to Sri Lanka.
Sri Lankan Tamils, in fact, with their adherence to the religious form of Saiva Siddhanta and conceived purity in the Tamil language they spoke and wrote, considered them culturally superior to the Tamils of Tamil Nadu. One could also remember that the former AIDDMK leader, M.K. Ramachandran descended from an Indian estate Tamil. These obviously prevented the Sri Lankan Tamil political leadership, with its concept of high ranking Velllala superiority, from forging links with the Tamil Nadu political hierarchy. In another context, Sri Lankan Tamil scholarship has endeavoured to establish a separate identity for Sri Lankan Tamils, which is quite distinct from that of Tamils of South India.
A question to be asked then is, ‘Did the volte face made by the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, after the eclipse of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s political fortunes, when she pointed out in Lok Sabha that India was threatened from all sides including the South (Read Sri Lanka)’ give the signal to Tamil Nadu to open a new front, which would also help keep the Tamil Nadu cauldron boiling over an extraneous issue rather than on domestic issues? This appears to be a legitimate question considering that the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of 1964, which concerned people of (recent) Indian origin in Sri Lanka, who originated from Tamil Nadu, particularly from the Tinnevelley and Ramanad Districts, did not create much interest among the people or the political leadership in Tamil Nadu, and looking at the way the Sri Lankan Tamil issue has remained the major contending issue among leading political groups in Tamil Nadu ever since. Subsidiary issues like the fishing disputes in the Palk Straits and attempts to reopen the Maritime Boundary Agreement have arisen, but these can be seen as pressure points arising from the main issue to keep the Centre engaged with Sri Lanka. The irony, however, is that the net result of the fishing dispute is that it adversely affects the Tamils of the Jaffna peninsula whose cause Tamil Nadu clams to be fighting for.
To resurrect the background, the opposing parties, DMK and AIDDMK and other were seen ranging themselves in heavy competition to support Sri Lankan Tamil politics, especially after it began to take a violent form in the late 1970s. When militant youth sought safe haven in Tamil Nadu after committing dastardly crimes in the island, Tamil Nadu political leadership provided a safe haven to them, different politicians providing patronage to rival groups. Later, this support progressed to providing funds, arms training and the supply of arms to these Tamil youth. Subsequently, Premier, Indira Gandhi, perhaps, sensing the danger to India’s own security of allowing lose groups to roam the streets of Tamil Nadu, instructed the RAW to take over their training, supply them arms and funds. It was with this sophistication that the groups met the Sri Lankan armed forces and planted mines and carried underwater sabotage. This gave RAW the opportunity to finger-print the Sri Lankan Tamil operatives in India. The net effect, however, was even more dangerous to the neighbourng country, because of the sophistication provided by RAW.
How far Tamil Nadu came to be involved in the Sri Lankan Tamil affair and how much it had become the main electoral issue, is seen from its lukewarm response, if not opposition, to New Delhi’s attempts to bring about a settlement. Its agenda was set on supporting separatism – ‘Eelam’. It opposed the deployment of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). However, there was nothing its political leadership could do to influence New Delhi on these moves, as the Centre had its own agenda in using the situation to India’s overall advantage. This was demonstrated in the way an Exchange of Letters attached to the July 1987 Agreement providing for India’s own security interests, namely, the exclusion of foreign navies from Trincomalee and (other ports) and gaining access to the oil storage wells. How adverse these conditions in the letters exchanged were from Sri Lanka’s point of view, was seen from President J. R. Jayewardene’s request to Premier Rajiv Gandhi, if the letters could remain ‘secret’. (Dixit).The Sri Lankan President realized what damage it could do to the political reputation of his government because the clauses meant a surrender of sovereignty to India, over the port of Trincomalee and other issues.
In another perspective, the special visit of Hilary Clinton, State Secretary of US to Chennai, over which some eye-brows were raised in the South Bloc, one of the ostensible objectives of which was to invite the entrepreneurs to investment partnership with US firms. However, this did not exclude discussion of the Sri Lankan Tamil issue, and as Assistant Secretary, Robert Blake, indicated in advance, it was to form part of the agenda. That should show how far the idea of St.Gilan principles, and their impact on foreign policy making by devolved units, which Chopra was commenting on, had settled down in the case of relations between the Centre and Tamil Nadu.
Three bi-lateral agreements signed between India and Sri Lanka deserve to be taken up for discussion in order to show through comparison and contrast, how India responded differently to the implementation of bi-lateral agreement signed between the two countries.
The first agreement of 18 January 1954 entered into between Prime Minister Kotelawala and Premier Nehru contained proposals relating to persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka, but concentrated mainly on procedures concerning illicit immigration to Sri Lanka and less on the vexed question of the future of the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. The significance is that India endorsed the proposed changes to the Immigration Act. It was ratified by the governments of both countries on 13 February 1954. The statement dated 10 October 1954 after the Conference in New Delhi held between the delegations led by the two Prime Ministers, laid down further agreed procedures in dealing with the people of Indian origin.
How the Indian side sabotaged the agreement is vividly described in a letter dated 25 September 1954 by Singleton Salmons, who was the nominated member of Parliament to represent plantation community interests. To make it short, the Indian High Commissioner, C. C. Desai, responded to Salmon that he “had provided ….facilities, there was an office with a desk and a chair, and if necessary an officer”. “But,” he said “although the facilities are there as laid down in the agreement I can assure you that not a single Indian will be registered.” This was the reply given to Salmon who reminded the High Commissioner that the agreement signed by his Prime Minister, stipulated that the Office of the High Commissioner would provide facilities to all those desirous of registering as Indians.
This shows how the Indian officialdom, nay India’s high diplomatic representative in the island, reduced an agreement signed by the two Prime Ministers to a mockery amounting to an insult to a bi-lateral partner. That is India’s own record of treating bi-lateral agreements ratified by both governments.
The amendment of the Indian Constitution in 1954 excluded the Indian labour in Sri Lanka from qualifying for Indian citizenship. The problem therefore, became one of Sri Lanka’s as a result of this exclusion. The question of moral responsibility, however, is a debatable one. But the relevance of fixing that blame on the Indian Government arises from the fact that the Indian Government did not cease to be interested in these people. It also comes into focus in connection with India’s claim of special relationship with Tamils of the North and East of the island.
The ‘Indo-Ceylon Agreement of January 1954, and October 1964’, and the ‘Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987’ generally referred to as the ‘Rajiv-JR Accord’ are the two major agreements entered into between the two South Asian neighbours. A third one was the Maritime Boundary Agreement, which followed the 1964 agreement. The October 1964 Agreement was seen as a meaningful step toward solving issues relating to ‘the Tamils of Indian origin’. The difference, this time, however, is that India accepted the repatriation of 525,000 and their natural increase as against Sri Lanka granting citizenship to 300,000 and their natural increase.
Tamil Nadu did not show any overt interest in the issue which saw New Delhi agreeing to accept 525, 000 people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka for repatriation to India.
India in 1964 was different from that of India that C. C. Desai represented in Ceylon in 1954. The defeat that the Chinese forces inflicted on the Indian Army during the border war in 1962 and China exploding a nuclear device the same year, which sent tremors throughout Asia, and the US moving the Seventh Fleet near to Vietnam, had brought India to re-evaluate her previous hegemonic attitudes as represented by diplomats like Desai, in dealing with Sri Lanka in a casual manner. Despite her friendly disposition towards India, Mrs Bandaraniake could not be expected to endorse India’s position on the border issue. She played a diplomatic role along with several other non-aligned leaders to bring about a settlement of the dispute. Overtly, this was appreciated in India but a declaration of support in favour of India could have gone down better.
Around the same time, India was facing problems of insurgency in Assam and Nagaland and it was alleged that these insurgents were going for arms training in China and then East Pakistan using Burmese territory. Though India under Premier Bahadur Shastri showed a hard position by insisting that Sri Lanka increased the number to be given Sri Lankan citizenship to 300,000, around the same time, India was facing the expulsion of Indians from Myanmar (then Burma) , under Gen. Ne Win’s Government. Prof. V. P. Dutt observes that the numbers involved were not negligible and could be either at least 300,000, and probably, the figure could go up to 400,000. Dutt says the Government of India did not make a public issue of it and resorted to quiet diplomacy to alleviate the difficulties and to secure facilities for the repatriation of those who were leaving including the removal of some assets in foreign exchange. In contrast to the Sri Lankan Prime Minister gong to New Delhi for discussions, it was Bahadur Shastri who went to Rangoon December 1965, exactly a year after inking the agreement with Colombo, to discuss the problem with Gen Ne Win. This was followed by another visit by Mrs. Indira Gandhi to Rangoon.
The contrast between the Agreement India reached with Sri Lanka and the situation in Myanmar were quite the opposite. While Mynmar allowed no repatriation of assets, a liberal arrangement for repatriation of assets of Indian workers was put in place in Sri Lanka. Besides, through bureaucratic intervention, the repatriation of persons who were granted Indian citizenships was made voluntary resulting in them staying in the island, at least till their retirement.
The Desai syndrome was not without its repetition in respect of the 1964 agreement too. Former Foreign Secretary, W. T. Jayasinghe, who played a key role in the negotiations of the agreement records in his book, The Indo-Ceylon Problem, 2002, that the Indian Foreign Secretary wagging his index finger telling D. B. Ellepola, former Civil Servant, ‘not a single Indian will be taken back.’ That remonstration was made in Colombo at a reception at Galle Face Hotel, sometime after the signing of the agreement and subsequent talks. This characterized the Indian bureaucratic attitude towards the agreement reached by the two leaders in 1964.
As it transpired, in the implementation stage of the 1964 agreement, Indian officialdom placed obstacles and slowed down the procedures of registration until it was time barred. Later, under the Jayewardene Government, even those persons who were given Indian citizenship and awaiting repatriation were granted Sri Lankan citizenship. That is how the bi-lateral agreement signed with India in 1964 also ended.
The July 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, for all ostensible purposes, was intended as a solution to the problem of another group of ethnic Tamils who shared common characteristics with Tamils of Tamil Nadu in terms of language and ethnicity, but served India’s overall strategic interests.
There cannot be any complaints on the part of India to any moves to re-examine the 13th Amendment on any moral grounds if one looks at the way India treated both the 1954 Agreement and 1964 Agreements on persons of Indian origin. Even with regard to the other Agreement on Maritime Boundaries, there is pressure to revise it. Unlike the Agreement of 1987, which is ostensibly, on an internal matter of Sri Lanka, the agreements signed in1954, 1964 and also the Maritime Boundaries Agreement are ones that involve the interests of both sides. The 1954 Agreement was ratified by both governments, yet it was rendered ‘null’. The Indian side had no compunction about rendering the implementation the agreements of 1954 and 1964 by placing bureaucratic obstacles. It is now calling for a revision of the Maritime Boundary Agreement.
Moral considerations cannot be one sided. That should equally apply to both sides.
(The writer was former Ambassador of Sri Lanka and has an intimate knowledge of circumstances relating to the 1964 Agreement as he worked in the Citizenship Division of the Ministry and also had close association with issues surrounding the 1987 Agreements with India)