by Lynn Ockersz

Apparently, ‘discourse’ in Sri Lanka on what has come to be characterized as the National Question is continuing to be bedeviled by issues in Historiography. If greater clarity is to be achieved in our understanding of the ‘conflict’ in this country, there needs to be objective, impartial, factual and unemotional commentary and writing on the issues at the heart of this country’s ethnic relations, which make-up a good part of the substance that constitutes our ‘conflict.’

While communalism and ethnic prejudice have been a fact of life in this country from perhaps the earliest decades of the century past and are still with us, we have not had in Sri Lanka a situation where our principal communities, as collectivities, have been in a chronic state of violent conflict with each other. It was not the case, even during the ‘holocaust’ of July 1983, that the ordinary man of the street was ‘going for the jugular’ of his neighbour, in consideration of the latter’s communal, cultural and other species of identity.

What we certainly did have in July 1983, for instance, were brutal mobs, whose members were apparently from the majority community, unleashing murderous violence on Tamil citizens and their properties, the majority of whom were not responsible for the violence unleashed at that time by militant organizations of the North-East against the state and its agencies. It was transparently clear that the majority of citizens within the Sinhala community and the majority of Tamil citizens were in no way party to or responsible for the hell-fires that swept Sri Lanka at that time. In fact, the Sinhala citizenry was not short of persons and groups who risked their lives to save the lives of fellow Tamil citizens. These considerations should give rise to the question as to whether it is accurate to habitually refer to the conflict in this country as partaking of the nature of a civil war. In fact the phrase ‘race riots’ could very well be a misnomer in the Lankan context.

Unfortunately, sections among even the so-called intelligentsia of this country have allowed themselves to be misguided by predominant opinion moulders, such as, some Western news agencies and other vested interests who are prone to simplify and sensationalize issues of the developing world. The conflict in Sri Lanka is of a high complexity and the cause of conflict management could be undermined through a tendency to be simplistic in analyzing the questions at the heart of our conflict.

In the case of Sri Lanka and other Third World countries weighed down by ‘communal strife’, the state and powerful political actors have played, for the most part, an active but destructive role. I would be stating what would now seem to be the obvious by taking up the position that sections of the state of those times planned, orchestrated and executed the ‘race riots’ of 1983. There were very powerful political hands at work during the riots and this aspect of the troubles is very well established. The marauding mobs which devastated Tamil lives and property were not acting alone but were virtually programmed to do so by some prominent and influential personalities in governing circles, besides others who had a vested interest in seeing Sri Lanka imploding amid heightening ‘communal tensions.’ To be sure, the relations among our communities are not free of troubling elements, such as stereotyping, ill-will and prejudice, but it is usually opportunistic powerful political forces and others who stand to gain by generating and sustaining communal tensions, who orchestrate and execute violence and rioting of this kind. What is simplistically labeled ‘ethnic violence’ is, therefore, far from spontaneous and ‘natural.’

On the other hand, the LTTE cannot be too closely identified and linked with the Tamil community, the majority of whose members are peace-loving, and were in no way supportive of the LTTE’s campaign of terror and violence. The LTTE consisted of some members of the local Tamil community but it cannot be argued on the basis of this premise that the Tigers were ‘produced’ by the Tamil community. It is now apparent that, for the most part, the so-called ordinary Tamil citizenry were at cross-purposes with the LTTE.

However, it could be argued that the Tigers were a product of those sections of the Tamil political and social elite who clamoured for secession and the carving-out of Sri Lanka. It was they who sowed the seeds of separatism in some impressionable Tamil minds who went on to form the separatist- oriented militant organizations of the North-East.

Likewise, it could be argued that it was ethnic chauvinism and anti-Tamil sentiment in the state and its agencies over the decades, which not only prepared the opinion climate in the South for the easy emergence of those destructive forces which put Sri Lanka to the torch in July 1983, for instance, but which, wittingly or unwittingly, helped the LTTE to prevail over the years. For, the chauvinisms of the North and South are mutually-reinforcing and tend to feed off each other. It is no accident that it was after July 1983 that the armed separatist campaign burgeoned and accelerated in the North-East.

Accordingly, the Sri Lankan state plays a critical ‘make or break’ role in the national rejuvenation context in particular. It would need to bear this in mind as its challenges mount on particularly the foreign relations front and as it faces the crucial obligation of putting things right on the basis of the LLRC report. It is not at all late to abandon the blighting legacies of the past and to begin anew to create an inclusive Sri Lankan polity where every citizen, irrespective of man-made differences, could live in dignity.COURTESY:THE ISLAND