{"id":40091,"date":"2005-11-13T08:00:31","date_gmt":"2005-11-13T12:00:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/dbsjeyaraj.com\/dbsj\/?p=40091"},"modified":"2015-03-30T08:25:19","modified_gmt":"2015-03-30T12:25:19","slug":"why-is-the-ltte-disappointed-with-ranil-wickramasinghe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dbsjeyaraj.com\/dbsj\/?p=40091","title":{"rendered":"Why is the LTTE disappointed with Ranil Wickramasinghe?"},"content":{"rendered":"

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj<\/strong><\/p>\n

T<\/strong>he attempt made by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to enforce a Tamil boycott of the Presidential elections will affect Ranil Wickremasinghe as the bulk of Tamil votes was expected to be cast for him. The LTTE – TNA press conference in Kilinochchi has made it clear that the tigers are in favour of a boycott. Earlier there were confused signals to
\nthat effect. Now it is in the open.<\/p>\n

A striking feature in the LTTE attempt to push for a boycott is its undisguised contempt for Ranil Wickremasinghe. There is subterranean anger rippling. Indeed the whole boycott exercise in the name of the people seems to be aimed at teaching Ranil a lesson he would never ever forget. It is almost like a lover’s quarrel because in
\npopular perception there was a tacit alliance and understanding between Ranil and the tigers.
\n
\nWhy is the LTTE pissed off about Wickremasinghe? The opinion of the TNA does not
\nmatter. Described often as tiger nominated agents by Douglas Devananda the TNA is
\nsimply a mouthpiece for the voice of the master!But why are tigers hostile to Ranil?<\/p>\n

The process of disillusionment with Wickremasinghe began from the time he was
\nPrime Minister. The original understanding between the UNP and LTTE forged mainlt
\nbetween ACS Hameed and Anton Balasingham envisaged an interim administration
\nfor the North – East under the LTTE. Hameed passed away but the UNP remained
\nwilling to set up an IA in principle.<\/p>\n

The LTTE was not happy about the slow progress in setting up an Interim
\nadministration during Wickremasinghe’s tenure as premier. It however accepted the
\nUNP position that it was difficult to proceed because Chandrika Bandaranaike
\nKumaratunga was Executive President and also due to lack of two – thirds majority to
\nchange entrenched restrictive clauses of the Constitution.<\/p>\n

Kumaratunga’s dismissal of Wickremasinghe’s government and subsequent election
\nstrengthened the UNP view that she was the stumbling block.The LTTE concurred.
\nThough the UPFA conducted a strong anti – tiger campaign Wickremasinghe was bold
\nenough to include the setting up of an interim Administration in the party
\nmanifesto.The UNP lost but Kumaratunga was unable to govern due to the forces of
\nracism she had unleashed.<\/p>\n

When it became clear that Presidential election 2005 was on the cards the LTTE
\nadopted a low – key approach to help Wickremasinghe. It avoided identifying with him
\nin any way because it felt such a link would be detrimental to him among Sinhala
\nvoters. The tigers were somewhat nonchalant about the elections and said they did
\nnot care. This made the coast clear for Tamil voters to back the candidate of their
\nchoice.<\/p>\n

The minorities particularly the Sri Lankan Tamils were happy about the ceasefire
\nbrought about jointly by Wickremasinghe. Rajapakse signed pacts with JVP and JHU
\nand targeted the majority community votes at the expense of the minorities. He
\ncategorically ruled out the homeland, self – determination concepts and also the
\nrejected P- TOMS. It was nothing but natural for the minority communities to back
\nRanil in such a situation. Besides there was always a tendency for Tamils to support
\nthe UNP in a situation where Tamil candidates were not contesting directly. This was
\nmore so among Colombo Tamils.<\/p>\n

Against such a backdrop Tamil votes were expected in massive numbers for
\nWickremasinghe independent of LTTE – TNA manipulation.. It was assumed that the
\nTNA directed by the LTTE will come out openly in support for Wickremasinghe about a
\nweek before the election. It was also suspected that the LTTE would swing into action
\na few days prior to the poll and influence Tamil voters in favour of Wickremasinghe.<\/p>\n

Why did this not happen? It was mainly due to the LTTE perception that Ranil
\nWickremasinghe was not playing fair by them.Suspicion created during the 2001 –
\n2003 period was further reinforced through some actions.<\/p>\n

Internationally Wickremasinghe and his deputies kept on cultivating the International
\ncommunity. This included visits to India and mention in sections of the Indian press
\nthat some understanding had been reached. An Indian connection real or imaginary
\nmakes the LTTE paranoid. The tigers were also harbouring a grudge about the
\nWashington summit. It felt the UNP had set them up on that.<\/p>\n

Wickremasinghe was also harping on Tokyo and Oslo summit declarations. This was
\nhis “clever” way of dealing with the South. The onus was put on the International
\ncommunity. But this had a counterproductive effect. The LTTE felt that
\nWickremasinghe was trying to trap them in protracted talks on exploring federalism by
\nway of Oslo resolution and adhere to benchmarks of democracy, pluralism, human
\nrights etc in terms of Tokyo. The LTTE kept away from Tokyo to avoid such
\nimpositions and took up the position that the Tokyo declaration did not bind them. But
\nWickremasinghe was saying the opposite.<\/p>\n

Then there was the so called International safety net. It was felt that one reason for
\nthe failure of the peace process was excessive internationalisation by the UNP.
\nWickremasinghe was trying to convince Sinhala voters that concessions to the LTTE
\nwas not dangerous because the international factor was there to guarantee
\nsecurity,sovereignity , unity and territorial integrity of the Country. The tigers felt that
\nthis was anothr ruse to trap them and confine them to an unproductive, prolonged
\nceasefire.<\/p>\n

The international factor was seen as something altering the balance of powerin favour
\nof the State. The tigers were also miffed by the silence of wickremasinghe on the EU
\ntravel ban.Thus the LTTE was getting suspicious that a second round of talks with
\nWickremasinghe as President would mean indefinite confinement to
\nnegotiations.Talks on the ISGa and possibly fedralism would go on and on while the
\nmovement was progressively weakened with international help.<\/p>\n

Domestically too Wickremasinghe was disappointing the tigers. His election manifesto
\nexcluded any reference to the Interim Administration or meaningful commitment to a
\nfederal solution. Concerned about Rajapakse’s appeal to the Sinhala constituency
\nWickremasinghe too was trying to pander to the same. While Mahinda was forthright
\nabout his stance Ranil was typically wishy – washy.<\/p>\n

Wickremasinghe also signed a 67 point agreement with Rauf Hakeem. Some of those
\nincluded third party status for Muslims in the peace talks and a separate N- E council
\nfor the Muslims on the principle of non – contiguous territory. This was anathema to
\nthe LTTE. Besides important decisions such as these could not be taken without
\nconsulting the other party to the peace process. This was seen as another trick to
\nstultify the LTTE.<\/p>\n

The UNP leader also spoke about striking a deal with bete noir Kumaratunga. A pan –
\nSinhala government was also talked about. The tigers could not stomach the notion of
\nWickremasinghe’s tete – a – tete with Kumaratunga after projecting her as the “enemy”
\n so far to the LTTE. The LTTE antipathy towards her is very real.Also a re- alignment
\nof Sinhala parties meant a “Sinhala Consensus”. Such consensus can only result in
\nfurther dilution of any political settlement.<\/p>\n

Notwithstanding all these “prickly issues” the LTTE may still have played ball with Ranil
\nif the UNP was prepared to grant two things. One was the setting up of an Interim
\nauthority without too much haggling. The second was a thorouh disbanding of so
\ncalled paramilitaries including the Karuna faction. It soon became apparent to the
\nLTTE that these were impossible.<\/p>\n

The ISGA would not have any meaningful powers desired by the LTTE. The Muslim
\ncard will be used to undermine it. The Supreme Court on P- TOMS demonstrated that
\neven if granted an ISGA will not be allowed to function. As for the Karuna faction it had
\nnow become integral to the politico – military machinations by the state in the East.
\nWickremasinghe would not be allowed to concede on Karuna even if he wanted to.It
\nwas also felt by the LTTE that Wickremasinghe was not going to push anything
\ndecisively or firmly .<\/p>\n

The tigers were also unhappy with the conduct of Wickremasinghe;s campaign. If
\nRajapakse was hard – selling the Sinhala line Wickremasinghe was soft – selling it.
\nRanil was not making strident anti – Tamil or anti – tiger remarks but he was not
\nmaking any pro – Tamil statements either. If one is genuinely keen about some issues
\nthen one must have the courage of convicyion to articulate those the LTTE felt.<\/p>\n

In an attempt to overtake Mahinda he was also pandering to Buddhist sentiments in a
\nclumsy manner. Writing books on Buddhism on the eve of his campaign and
\npromising the world’s tallest Buddhst monument etc were some of thewse. It was
\nbecoming increasingly clear to the LTTE that both Wickremasinghe and Rajapakse
\nwere two sides of the same coin. The LTTE felt that both were the same in substance
\nand only the styles differed.This is incorrect but that was the tiger perception.<\/p>\n

Wickremasinghe in LTTE perception was the dangerous of the two. Rajapakse was
\nbluntly direct in his stance. The world at large knew he was a hardliner and that if
\nelected war was on the cards. But Wickremasinghe’s image was that of a peace loving
\nman ready to do business with the LTTE. If Wickremasinghe came to power and
\ncontinued his “slipery” politics world opinion would be with him if war broke out. But
\nwith Rajapakse the LTTE had the moral high ground. If war erupted the international
\nfactor would back Wickremasinghe. The position was unclear with Rajapakse in the
\nsaddle.<\/p>\n

The biggest problem for the LTTE was to avoid a repetition of the Kumaratunga
\nphenomenon in the case of Wickremasinghe. In 1994 she had swept to power as an
\nangel of peace with the overwhelming support of the Tamil people. It was an uphill
\ntask for the tigers to destroy that image. Now Wickremasinghe was fast acquiring a
\nprince of peace image among the Tamil people. It was necessary to preempt
\nthat.From a tiger perspective the Tamil people had to be shaken free of such illusions.<\/p>\n

Any hesitation by the LTTE was removed by Wickremasinghe himself when he went to
\nPalaly on Nov 3rd. He confined himself to the security forces alone and did not meet
\nthe Tamil people. Even Rajapakse had a token meeting with a captive Tamil audience.
\nRanil did not. When asked about meeting Tamils he “arrogantly” said that he knew the
\nTamil people’s problems via telephone calls and leters etc. Furthermore he spoke
\nabout modernising the army. Ranil also boasted about 23 LTTE ships being
\ndestroyed during the ceasefire.<\/p>\n

This was the proverbial last straw. On Nov 5th Balakumaran came over the air on
\n“Voice of Tigers” and pitched in. The point he made was that Rajapakse and
\nWickremasinghe were the same as far as the Tamil issue was concerned.
\nWickremasinghe was more dangerous because he pretended to be a moderate.
\nSome Tamil people too were confused. As such the people had to be informed about
\nRanil’s true colours. The presidential election was of no importance or relevance to
\nthe Tamil people in this situation.<\/p>\n

The floodgates opened after Balakumar’s outburst. Wickremasinghe is criticised as
\nunreliable, crafty and duplicitous. The comments of Dissanaike and Moragoda about
\nKaruna, ceasefire, loss of LTTE ships, trapping the LTTE, international community etc
\nare helping LTTE propagandists to justify their position. It must be remembered that
\nDissanaikes speech made on Nov 3rd was reported only on the 7th. Moragodas
\ninterview appeared on the 9th. But Balakumar’s comment made on the 5th was
\ncirculated all over the “Tamil world” on Nov 6th. So comments by the UNP stalwarts
\nare strengthening the LTTE argument now but the cause for tiger resentment of
\nWickremasinghe was earlier and different.<\/p>\n

One thing however is that the claims purportedly made by Moragoda and
\nDissanayake cannot be new to the LTTE. If there is merit or validity in those
\narguments then the LTTE must surely have known it long ago. The tigers are not
\nkittens who opened their eyes only after these revelations. The tiger mouthpiece
\n“Tamilnet” however is going to town with its angled accounts of those comments<\/p>\n

Basically the LTTE is disillusioned and disappointed with Wickremasinghe. It must be
\nunderstood that the manifesto and conduct of Wickremasinghe’s campaign was not
\nenough for the LTTE to support it openly without losing credibility in the eyes of the
\nTamils. But if the TNA was allowed by the LTTE to negotiate with the UNP the situation
\nmay have been different.The Tamil case has suffered through default. It also appears
\nthat Wickremasinghe blundered by taking the Tamil votes for granted.<\/p>\n

It is however a moot point whether the call for a boycott – direct or indirect – will help
\nthe LTTE in the long run. It is possible that a Wickremasinghe defeat made possible
\nthrough a tiger boycott would strengthen the victor Rajapakse in an unimaginable
\nmanner. It is one thing for war to erupt due to a Rajapakse victory despite the Tamils
\nvoting for Wickremasinghe. It is totally different if Rajapakse wins because of a tiger –
\ninspired Tamil boycott. The LTTE should give much thought to this .<\/p>\n

Tweet<\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj The attempt made by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to enforce a Tamil boycott of the Presidential elections will affect Ranil Wickremasinghe as the bulk of Tamil votes was expected to be cast for him. The LTTE – TNA press conference in Kilinochchi has made it clear that the tigers are …<\/p>\n

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