{"id":28974,"date":"2014-03-24T17:14:14","date_gmt":"2014-03-24T21:14:14","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/dbsjeyaraj.com\/dbsj\/?p=28974"},"modified":"2014-03-24T17:14:14","modified_gmt":"2014-03-24T21:14:14","slug":"russian-referendum-in-crimea-and-the-tamil-demand-for-a-referendum-in-north-eastern-sri-lanka","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dbsjeyaraj.com\/dbsj\/?p=28974","title":{"rendered":"Russian Referendum in Crimea and the Tamil Demand for a Referendum in North -Eastern Sri Lanka"},"content":{"rendered":"


\nby<\/p>\n

N Sathiya Moorthy
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

Independent of the fate of the UNHRC vote this time, the recent referendum in distant Crimea should be a shocking eye-opener to Sri Lankan stake-holders of the ‘ethnic issue’, ‘accountability calls’ and all attendant concerns. At this rate, they could soon find either the Tamil community, or the Sri Lankan nation, or both, becoming mere pawns in the international war of high-stakes in which they would have next to no say, directly or otherwise. <\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

The pace of the Ukraine developments and the consequent Crimean referendum should have taken even the people and political leaderships concerned by surprise. If the ethnic players in Sri Lanka have not got a hang of what’s happening there, they could and should be forgiven. The fact that the SLT Diaspora is also equally shocked into silence, when they should have ordinarily urged Russia already, for backing a referendum-demand in Sri Lanka should show that they are as much confused as any other. Or, they possibly do not want to upset the UNHRC apple-cart when the Anglo-American authors of the upcoming resolution are seen as having already ‘diluted’ their draft, yet with a real hard-line improvement expected to be put to vote this time round. <\/p>\n

Drawing from the Crimean referendum, the Sri Lankan Government should ask itself about the non-issue-specific mood, if any, among its international backers, on a popular vote of the kind, which is what the hard-line sections of the Tamils, particularly the Diaspora, has been at for long. On the other, the Tamils, particularly the inland political leadership, should study the possible consequences of the current phase that they have allowed the Diaspora and the latter’s international backers to lead them on, and its resultant impact on their professed position on a ‘negotiated settlement within a united Sri Lanka’. <\/p>\n

‘Cold War’ back to Europe? <\/strong><\/p>\n

Since the conclusion of the Second World War, all military\/militant engagements have inched towards South Asia, closing in on India in particular, for no particular cause or reason. Whether involving regional and\/or extra-regional players, State and\/or non-State actors, a la Vietnam, West Asia\/Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, or those involving two nuclear neighbours in Indian and Pakistan in particular, South Asia has seen ’em all closing in from the larger Asian periphery on either side. <\/p>\n

It’s thus for the first time in seven long decades that Europe faces at least the theoretical possibility of ‘hot war’, should events in and about Ukraine-Crimea lead to one. That Ukraine-Crimea, unlike all the orchestrated popular uprisings of the post-Cold War era has kicked off the ‘second Cold War’ is there for all to see. Notwithstanding Croatia, Kosovo, or Georgia, which were all localised to specific locales in Europe (apart from Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, elsewhere) and whose course and result were tailor-made and almost scripted in advance, the ‘Ukraine-Crimean episode’ has the potential to trigger the revival of a forgotten and forgettable global past. <\/p>\n

One, the Ukraine unrest and the consequent the Crimean referendum, and the quick-fix Russian decisions and resolve have stalled the Euro-American juggernaut for the selective and provocative advancement in the name of ‘democracy and freedoms’ across the world in the post-Cold War era. Two, it has brought ‘Cold War’ unease and discomfort to the heart of Europe. Three, it has provoked the post-Cold War Moscow enough, to join issue head-on with the West, without looking the other way, as in the case of the earlier, ‘Orange Revolution’ and the like, some of them in the immediate neighbourhood of the erstwhile Soviet Union – and forming a part thereof. <\/p>\n

Short-cut to success <\/strong><\/p>\n

Possibly knowing the short, medium and long-term consequences for the nation and Europe and the rest of the world as a whole if the intermediary Ukraine impasse were allowed to hang in the air for long, Russia obviously took the short-cut to success by facilitating the quick and quick-fix referendum in Crimea. Clearly, it does not want to provoke the West beyond a point, nor does it want to be provoked into initiating a more dangerous course, whose ultimate consequences none today is in a position to predict. <\/p>\n

If the West handed down a fait accompli to Moscow in Ukraine, Russia has since returned the compliment. Either, it’s scores settled and quits for all sides, or the Ukrainian revolution and the Crimean referendum would become the bargaining-chips for a dialogue process. In either case, the US-led West on the one side, and Moscow on the other have seem to have consulted the real stake-holders in any serious way. Nor can they be expected to do so, even if there were to be a reversal of any kind on the ground, even theoretically speaking. <\/p>\n

China too has been cautious in not pre-judging Ukraine-Crimea developments. Nor has it shown great enthusiasm in siding exclusively with either party. Definitely, the Chinese do not want to be drawn into a war, cold or hot, that is not theirs to begin with. Yet, considering the irritants flowing from its recent unilateral moves on territorial issues with Vietnam and Japan, it cannot play the isolation game all by itself. Nor can play the game in isolation. It will have to end up choosing one or the other in what is now an European affair. That will have to determine the American disposition to China’s territorial interests in the latter’s neighbourhood, and Russia’s in its own neighbourhood – Ukraine-Crimea, in this case. <\/p>\n

The Ukraine-Crimea issue may even die its natural death after a few moves, some of them false too, by either player. Yet, the world will not be the same again, as the West has scripted and sketched thus far in the post-Cold War era. They now have Russia to contend with, and the larger Europe to reckon with. Russia itself will have to decide whether it should continue to be seen as playing second fiddle to China – or, pretend to be a partner on the latter’s terms – and if such an equation is for real. <\/p>\n

Does it mean that Russia is ready to take on the West on the latter’s ‘invasive\/interventionist’ trail elsewhere, too? Or, will Moscow be content, for instance, with defending its ‘supreme national interest’ in the immediate neighbourhood and periphery, not wanting to – and equipped to — revive the ‘Cold War’ past? If latter is the case, it will need allies and friends across the world. Small as they may be otherwise in terms of size, economies and militaries, such nations, a UNSG veto is what many of those nations would expect in return. <\/p>\n

However, in economic and military terms, Russia by itself may find some of their expectations unsustainable after a time. Moscow will have before it the Soviet past. Over-stretching its military-economic aid was among the causes for the collapse of Soviet communism, almost overnight. Nations that had got used to Soviet aid, assistance and more suddenly found that the tap had gone try for no fault of theirs. They too have memories.
\n
\nReferendum demand in Sri Lanka <\/strong><\/p>\n

The Crimean referendum is a stand-alone issue for Russia.Moscow need not judge the long-pending Tamil demand for a referendum of the kind in Sri Lanka by its own immediate concerns in Europe. Diplomacy is all about not taking universal or moral positions, but having the tact to explain away individual situations individually. The US and the rest of the West too have gotten away with it all in the past. <\/p>\n

Yet, nearer home, the Sri Lankan Government will have problem, justifying to the Tamils the conflicting Russian position on referendum in Crimea and the former’s demand for one in the North and the East. More importantly, the Russian position on Crimea is going to embolden the Sri Lankan Tamil (SLT) Diaspora, and inject fresh hopes into their agenda for a separate nation, possibly without blood-shed. <\/p>\n

If not on the ground, or in the UN and elsewhere, but at least in debating clubs across the world, they would be happy to see that those speaking for Russian support to Sri Lanka are embarrassed. They would move on with their self-motivating, self-falsified hopes of a ‘separate state’ and urge their suffering people back home to wait and wait and wait for the ‘promised land’. They alone would continue to live in peace and prosperity in the lands that they had promised themselves decades ago while their brethren back home continue to live in despair, not even a distant hope. <\/p>\n

The TNA, over the years, might have to take one more wrong step, post-war, one more time. Alternatively, the methodologically and mechanically divided leadership might have to find ways to discharge their legitimate duties to their population within a ‘united Sri Lanka’, as they have promised themselves, their suffering people and the world at large. Post-insurgent communities elsewhere are known to have quickly developed an aversion for their ‘legitimate rulers’ as the latter continue to blame their present inefficiencies to the past, and blind-pledge the people’s collective future to their own inefficient present. <\/p>\n

Tempting as the Crimean referendum may be for ‘Tamil separatists’, any demand of the kind nearer home in Sri Lanka, rather than in the SLT Diaspora homes far away, will have consequences. For starters, critics of the TNA in the majority ‘Sinhala-Buddhist’ community would tell a larger, post-war, ‘neo-Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist’ constituency, that they had been proved right in dubbing the party as an ‘LTTE stooge’. Having committed itself to a ‘political solution within a united Sri Lanka’, any turn-around at this stage, or even later, whatever the provocation and justification, will only be misunderstood – and\/or misinterpreted — even by the Tamils’ traditional sympathisers across the country.
\n
\nGlobal muscle-flexing <\/strong><\/p>\n

In geo-strategic terms, any fallout of the Crimea referendum has the potential for reviving and recasting a ‘neo-cold war’ all over again. Alternatively, any respite from a revival of the kind could involve compromises and compensations, between the global powers, now and\/or later. Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans, the Tamils included, will have no role. But they could be used (up) as pawns in a game that they did not play, nor did they want to play, nor did they understand. <\/p>\n

As if to assuage possible Sri Lankan anxieties of every kind just now, and just days ahead of the Geneva vote, Russia said that its principled position on Sri Lanka and the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) Report, was aimed at assisting the post war recovery process. “We support Sri Lanka’s efforts towards post-conflict recovery, development and complete reconciliation on the basis that there cannot be external interference and pressure,” said navy Captain Igor Pavlov, Military, Air and Naval Attache to the Embassy of the Russian Federation, speaking at the ‘Defender of the Motherland Day’ function in Colombo. <\/p>\n

Local media reports also quoted Pavlov “pointing out that the two countries had an excellent understanding on a range of multilateral issues, he pledged continuous Russian support to Sri Lanka internationally and at global forums”. He said “there is ample scope for developing the extensive exchanges, including military-technical cooperation. Our bilateral relations are based on mutual respect and understanding”. <\/p>\n

Independent of Russian sentiments for and on Sri Lanka – and also owing to that — the existing and emerging ethnic situation is a ripe case for global muscle-flexing and for re-creating the forgotten Cold War bloc system. For now, however, Ukraine-Crimea, and not Sri Lanka, is at the centre of the same from the Sino-Russian camp, as had been anticipated at the commencement of the UNHRC session. Reports at the time had claimed that the two UNSC veto-powers, along with Iran and Cuba, among other ‘Friends of Sri Lanka’, would move a counter-resolution to the Anglo-American draft. This has materialised, however. <\/p>\n

Independent of UNHRC, but also owing the Ukraine-Crimea crisis, the much talked-about Indian Ocean sea-lanes and their security could still be the focal-point, either for a show-down or a settlement – the latter, real or illusory. Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans, the Tamil included, cannot escape either. Between them, and otherwise, too, the Government and the people, starting with the Tamils, will have to decide if this is what they wanted, and have aspired for themselves and their nation. They would also have to decide if they wanted Sri Lanka to instead become the eye of what promises to be an emerging global geo-strategic storm, as against what remains an one-sided western initiative at Geneva. <\/p>\n

Worse still for Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans – and also their Indian Ocean neighbours starting with India — such a course alone would have ensured an end to the a possibly emerging ‘neo-cold war’ in Europe — without ending the ‘neo-cold war’ per se on the global arena. Re-focussing the neo-cold war to South Asia’s Indian Ocean neighbourhood would have meant that the extra-regional powers had successfully shifted the ‘cold war’ dynamics all over again to where it had always belonged – and where it was possibly supposed to belong, too. <\/p>\n

Such a scenario could also facilitate the emerging super-power in China better than if Europe were to be the theatre of the neo-cold war. Simply put, the waters around Sri Lanka need not be as placid as it has been with the exit of the ‘Sea Tigers’, what with the Anglo-American lease deed on Diego Garcia too coming up for possible renewal by 2016. <\/p>\n

Reviving political negotiations <\/strong><\/p>\n

It is in this overall context, the recent London observation by India’s Minister for External Affairs, Salman Khrushid, assumes greater significance and immediate relevance. He said that the Tamils in Sri Lanka should revive political negotiations with their Government. According to Khurshid, such a course alone would give India the leverage to make the Sri Lankan Government give the Tamils their due. <\/p>\n

Two long years of UNHRC proceedings has taken a course of its own, rather than serving as leverage for the international community to ensure speedy initiatives from the Sri Lankan Government on political negotiations. ‘Accountability issues’ is no more the means to an anticipated\/acceptable end to the ethnic issue, as may have been promised, or hoped for. Instead, it has become an end in itself, both for its promoters, and now for the Sri Lankan State, the Government, the majority Sinhala-Buddhist polity and their constituencies, too. <\/p>\n

No stake-holder in Sri Lanka has thus been left with the time, energy and not certainly the inclination to revive the political negotiations between any two UNHRC sessions in Geneva, which come every six months. Almost from the commencement of the UNHRC process, Sri Lanka has been consistent in not wanting its supporters in the international community — committed and\/or fence-sitters — to get the wrong message that Colombo was weakening and dithering, after all. Ditto, too, with the Tamils and the TNA, back home. This has created a deadlock of sorts, which needs to be broken if a political settlement were to be brokered. <\/p>\n

The Indian concerns for reviving the political negotiations have to be thus understood in the context of the current deadlock in the Sri Lankan processes – as different from Sri Lanka-related processes – as the former alone could end the ethnic stalemate, if at all, and for good. The legitimate concerns of the Indian neighbour on the stability in and of Sri Lanka should flow from the contribution — or the absence of it – originating in turn from the current UNHRC-like processes. <\/p>\n

The intervening international mention of applying a more direct R2P regimen in and upon Sri Lanka, going beyond what the US-led UNHRC resolutions have stated – or, hidden – over the past two years, have consequences for the continued stability of Sri Lanka, without such a course encouraging to ending the ethnic stalemate, as had been hoped for. The concerns of a post-poll government in New Delhi cannot be any different. Nor can\/will it continue to be influenced by the externally-orchestrated ‘Tamil Nadu factor’, if the post-poll coalition scenario could\/would help such a course, or even encourage one, precisely for the same reason(s). <\/p>\n


\n(The writer is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter) <\/em><\/p>\n

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by N Sathiya Moorthy Independent of the fate of the UNHRC vote this time, the recent referendum in distant Crimea should be a shocking eye-opener to Sri Lankan stake-holders of the ‘ethnic issue’, ‘accountability calls’ and all attendant concerns. At this rate, they could soon find either the Tamil community, or the Sri Lankan nation, …<\/p>\n

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