“Thus the violence of the oppressor silenced the non-violence of the oppressed; the armed might of Sinhala chauvinism crushed the ahimsa of the Tamils. This historical event marked the beginning of a political experience that was crucial to the Tamil national struggle, an experience that taught the Tamils that the moral power of non-violence could not consume the military power of a violent oppressor whose racial hatred transcends all ethical norms of humanness and civilized behaviour.
To the oppressor this event encouraged the view that military terrorism is the only answer to the Tamil demand and that the non-violent foundation of the Tamil political agitation is a weak and impotent structure against the barrel of the gun.” – Anton Balasingham in LTTE booklet “Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam Freedom Struggle”
February 20th 1961 is a very important date in the history of the Sri Lankan Tamil political struggle to regain lost rights.
It was on this day, fifty years ago that the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) known in English as the Federal Party (FP) led by SJV Chelvanayakam commenced a non – violent direct action campaign against the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) Government headed by the world’s first woman Prime minister Sirima Bandaranaike.
Years and years of witnessing a brutal armed struggle by Tamil militants has created an impression in the minds of many that the nature of Tamil politics in this country has been intrinsically violent. This violence has even served vested interests to dismiss the justice of the Tamil cause and portray the “problem” as being an issue concerning law and order only.
What is forgotten, ignored or conveniently overlooked is the fact that for over three decades in post – Independence Sri Lanka the Tamil political struggle was basically non – violent and adhered to the noble doctrine of “Ahimsa” (avoidance of injury/violence) enunciated by that great apostle of non – violence Mahatma Gandhi.
It has been argued by many that it was the failure of the non –violent Tamil struggle to remedy prevailing political maladies that paved the way for an emerging, frustrated generation of Tamil youth to take to the gun.
Whatever the merits or otherwise of this argument there is no denying that the third quarter of the twentieth century is replete with instances of non – violent political dissent and protest conducted by the Sri Lankan Tamils. Hartals, Satyagrahas, black flag demonstrations, marches, processions, mass demonstrations, protest fasts, days of mourning, civil disobedience, civil resistance, boycotts, etc were a regular feature of Tamil politics in those days.
The high watermark of this politics of non – violent protest was the great “Satyagraha” campaign launched on February 20th in 1961.
It is an event that the Tamils of Sri Lanka can be proud of as an achievement where a small, unarmed, defenceless people through united effort and dedication paralysed the administrative m machinery of the Colombo government for nearly two months in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka until military repression was unleashed.
The deployment of the armed forces was in a way a harbinger of the future of the Tamil dominated Northern Province and Tamil majority Eastern Province where increased radicalisation was met by increased militarisation.
Today there is a pervasive presence of the armed forces in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Representative politics is in a state of decline and decay in those provinces.
The 1961 Satyagraha despite its fundamental non – violent nature also displayed signs of the future course of Tamil politics. The impatience displayed by some youths who engaged in acts of defiance indicated the possible rise of militancy.
Also the acts of civil disobedience like running a parallel postal service during the campaign were straws in the wind pointing towards flourishing separatism of the future.
What is sadly noteworthy about the entire exercise is the fact that the FP was an electoral ally of the SLFP in the 1960 July elections that propelled Mrs. Bandaranaike to power.
Despite this positive feature, events took a turn for the worse and within a year the chief political parties of the Sinhala and Tamil people were at loggerheads with each other. This political breakdown resulted in the politics of confrontation and culminated in the 1961 Satyagraha.
In order to understand this state of affairs it is necessary to delve deep into the two general elections of March and July 1960 where the FP played a significant role in unmaking and making the governments of Dudley Senanayake and Sirima Bandaranaike.
What led the FP to throw in its lot with the SLFP against the UNP and what caused the rupture in this SLFP – FP relationship are developments worthy of detailed scrutiny in this respect.
An analysis of those by – gone events are necessary at this juncture to appreciate fully the backdrop against which the 1961 Satyagraha was staged.
Intricate political negotiations were on between the March and July elections of 1960. The FP played a prominent role in these behind the scene moves. These matters need to be examined more closely in order to comprehend the political environment which paved the way for the 1961 Satyagraha.
The vehemence and determination shown by the SLFP govt and opposition FP during the Satyagraha turmoil can be contextually understood only if the political foreplay between March–July 1960 is scrutinised.
The assassination of SWRD Bandaranaike in September 1959 saw the maverick W. Dahanayake becoming Prime minister. His tenure however was short lived and fresh elections were conducted in March 1960. For the first time polling in all parts of the country from Paruthithurai to Devinuwara were held on a single day.
The number of seats in Parliament increased from 101 to 157. Six of these were appointed MP’s while 151 were elected from 145 electorates. The constituencies of Colombo South, Akurana, Batticaloa and Mutur had two Members each while Colombo Central had three.
Dudley Senanayake who had gone into voluntary retirement in 1953 had re-entered politics in 1957. He led the United National Party (UNP) in the 1960 Polls. The SLFP was led by CP de Silva.
SWRD’s widow Sirima did not take the centre stage when the election campaign got underway but got involved in canvassing at a later stage
Other Prime ministerial aspirants were Philip Gunewardene of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP)Dr. NM Perera of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and of course the outgoing caretaker PM Wijayananda Dahanayake of the Lanka Prajathanthrawadi Peramuna (LPP).
When results were announced it was a hung Parliament. The UNP had 50 and the SLFP 46. The LSSP and MEP had 10 each. The third largest party was the FP with 15 seats. It appeared that the FP held the balance of power in the new Parliament
The party had won the seats of Kankesanthurai(KKS), Vaddukkoddai, Nallur, Chavakachcheri, Point Pedro,Uduvil, Kayts,Kopay,Kilinochchi and Mannar in the Northern Province and the electorates of Batticaloa, Paddiruppu, Kalkudah, Trincomalee and Mutur in the Eastern Province.
Governor – General Sir Oliver Goonetillleke regarded as partisan towards the UNP called upon Dudley Senanayake to form a new government as the party had the most number of seats in Parliament.It was however doubtful whether Dudley could cobble together the majority required to form a stable government.
Even with the aid of the six appointed MP’s nominated by the new Premier and the support of a few Independent MP’s and crossers over from the LPP , Dudley had only 60-61 out of 157. But if he could get the 15 seat support from the FP the UNP leader was optimistic of garnering further support from more Independent MP’s and by weaning away some breakaways from smaller parties.
Thus the support of Chelvanayakam was crucial for Senanayake to form a viable government.Likewise the Support of the FP was equally important for the SLFP if it was requested to form an alternative govt
So when the victorious FP leader Chelvanayakam flew from Palaly to Ratmalana he was a much desired person politically.
Eminent persons such as ex –Prime minister Sir John Kotelawela, former state councillor Sir Arunachalam Mahadeva, retd chief justice Sir Edward Jayatilleka and former Justice minister and Senate leader Sir Lalitha Rajapaksa wooed Chelvanayakam ardently on behalf of the UNP and set up meetings with Dudley Senanayake.
But the SLFP had an ace up its sleeve which the UNP could not compete against.
That was the agreement signed by SWRD Bandaranaike and SJV Chelvanayakam in June 1957 known as the Banda – Chelva or B-C pact.
This pact agreed to set up one regional council for the North and two for the east with provision to amalgamate. It also agreed for positive measures on the use of Tamil in administration and in courts and set out guidelines on colonisation.
Opposition to the BC pact by the UNP and sections of the Buddhist clergy had compelled Bandaranaike to abrogate the pact unilaterally.
Chelvanayakam had a surprise visitor when he landed at Ratmalana. This was none other than former Up Country Tamil MP D.Ramanujan.
He was there representing Saumiyamoorthy Thondaman the president of the Ceylon Workers Congress. With Dudley Senanayake being close towards Plantation Tamil leader SP Vaithilingam, the resourceful Thondaman was moving closer to the SLFP at that time.
The CWC had reached a general understanding with the FP that the Sri Lankan Tamil party should also espouse the cause of Up Country Tamils in negotiations with any government in power. As such there was political affinity between both parties.
Ramanujam persuaded Chelvanayakam to drop in at Thondaman’s CWC office to meet with a surprise guest. Chelvanayakam obliged. Waiting for him with Thondaman was Dr. Badi – ud- din Mahmood the educationist.
Dr. Mahmood who later became Education minister in Mrs.Bandaranaike’s govt was very close to the Bandaranaike family and was one of those who played a role in bringing her to active politics.
BANDA –CHELVA PACT
Dr. Mahmood told Chelvanayakam that the SLFP was prepared to resurrect the Banda –Chelva pact and set up Regional Councils with even more powers over lands and colonisation if the FP refrained from supporting the UNP .
He also promised progressive concessionary measures for the use of Tamil in the administrative and legal spheres. The shrewd Mahmood pointed out that the UNP could not grant the B-C pact to the FP.
Thus Chelvanayakam was fortified with the knowledge that the B-C pact was in the pipeline when he engaged in talks with Dudley Senanayake.
Besides the FP was also miffed at pre-mature media reports that Dudley Senanayake had informed the Governor –General of the FP’s support even before negotiations had commenced.
At discussions with Dudley Senanayake the FP leader placed four broad demands orally. One was that Regional Councils as envisaged by the BC pact be set up with powers over land alienation and development.
The second was parity of status for Tamil as a language of administration and courts.
The third was for amendments to the Ceylon citizenship act no 18 of 1948 enabling speedier, enhanced registration of de- citizenised and disenfranchised Up Country Tamils.
The fourth demand was that four of the six Appointed MP slots be given to Up Country Tamil representatives
Chelvanayakam informed Senanayake that the FP was prepared to compromise slightly on the demands if necessary. The party would support the UNP if Senanayake would make a genuine effort in alleviating the travails experienced by Tamils.
The meeting ended without Senanayake inquiring about demands Chelvanayakam was willing to whittle down. The next meeting was scheduled for March 26th.
Again the SLFP moved fast and outsmarted Dudley.
Chelvanayakam had a young visitor on March 23rd. This was Felix R Dias Bandaranaike – the nephew of SWRD Bandaranaike -elected from Dompe.
The brilliant young lawyer was the rising star in the SLFP. Felix’s father the Supreme court Judge was a close friend of Chelvanayakam
Felix assured Chelvanayakam that the SLFP would follow the measures agreed between SWRD Bandaranaike and SJV Chelvanayakam in 1957. The B-C pact would be implemented in full and regional councils set up. Felix also told Chelva that the SLFP would make a policy declaration on this in presenting the throne speech.
When Senanayake met Chelvanayakam on March 26th, the UNP leader outlined his difficulties in acceding to FP demands. He requested Chelvanayakam to tone down the demands if possible.
SJV then told Dudley that the FP would drop its demand for parity of status between the Sinhala and Tamil languages. The FP would be satisfied with provisions for use of Tamil as an official language in the North and East and for reasonable usage in the administrative and legal spheres.
The FP was also ready to accept one Plantation Tamil representative to be appointed MP instead of four as demanded.
The party however was not ready to compromise on the other two demands pertaining to the regional councils and citizenship act. Senanayake then asked the FP to submit the final demands in writing. This was done on the same day.
On March 27th morning, Senanayake contacted Chelvanayakam and asked for his support in electing a UNP candidate as Speaker. Chelvanayakam declined saying the party had pledged support to the opposition candidate.
Subsequently the opposition nominee TB Subasinghe defeated the govt nominee Sir Albert Peiris.
Senanayake met with Chelvanayakam again on March 27th evening.
On that occasion Senanayake candidly informed Chelvanayakam that he could not help set up regional councils as envisaged by the B- C pact as the UNP had opposed it vehemently as a stepping stone for separation.
Instead he asked the FP to trust him and promised that he would not act detrimentally towards Tamils. He also offered ministerial portfolios to the FP.
Chelvanayakam declined the portfolios and withdrew from discussions. It was apparent that the talks had collapsed.
Nevertheless there was constant pressure by prominent Colombo Tamils on the FP in general and Chelvanayakam in particular that Dudley Senanayake as a “gentleman in politics” should be unconditionally supported.
The FP remained firm in resisting these pressures
An important reason for the FP stance was because the party had already arrived at an “understanding” with the SLFP on matters concerned.
Apart from the preliminary “talks” between Chelva and Felix an official SLFP delegation comprising CP de Silva, Maithripala Senanayake, AP Jayasuriya and Felix Dias Bandaranaike also met with a FP team led by Chelvanayakam.
Chelvanayakam placed the same four demands submitted to the UNP to the SLFP also. The SLFP at the outset declared that the party would not enter into a formal agreement with the FP.
Given the history of Sinhala opposition to the B-C pact it was not practical to forge another official pact again. But the SLFP proposed to make an explicit policy statement on issues raised by the FP when it presented its own throne speech if and when asked to form a government after the anticipated fall of the UNP govt.
On the four demands raised the SLFP delegation led by CP de Silva deviated slightly from the position articulated by Felix Bandaranaike.
The SLFP was transparently frank in saying that it too was opposed to the setting up of regional councils for the North and East. Notwithstanding SWRD’s readiness to set up regional councils, subsequent events had eroded that concept.
The SLFP said it was not possible to make special arrangements for the Tamil majority North and East alone. That would lead to a Sinhala backlash
What the SLFP proposed instead was the setting up of District Councils for each administrative or revenue district. There were 22 then. Each district council would in essence have the powers and functions as envisaged for the Regional council.
The Jaffna,Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa councils would have Tamil dominated administrations. The SLFP re-iterated that the basic powers of the Regional council would be available under the District council also.
On the question of Language the SLFP was not prepared for parity of status. It was however ready to introduce and implement measures enabling Tamil to be used for administrative purposes and in courts in the North and East. Provision for reasonable use of Tamil outside the north and east would also be made.
The Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act presented by SWRD Bandaranaike and approved by Parliament in August 1958 would set out the guidelines in this.
The SLFP however rejected any amendment to the citizenship act. It was inflexible on that count but agreed to nominate two Plantation Tamils as appointed MP/s.
The SLFP also said that the CWC’s Thondaman would be nominated as appointed MP and that issues concerning Up Country Tamils would be ironed out with him
The SLFP stated that all assurances and pledges on these issues would be given concrete form as a statement of policy in the throne speech. There would however be no pact or agreement in written form.
After laying out its cards openly the SLFP told the FP that if the Sinhala party defaulted on its assurances the Tamil party always had the option of voting against it after the throne speech debate.
Without FP support the SLFP govt would fall. As such the party cannot afford to dishonour its promises it was pointed out.
Despite the SLFP position being non – conciliatory on certain aspects, the FP decided then to extend support towards it and vote against the UNP.
The proposed implementation of the essential aspects of the agreement reached with SWRD Bandaranaike proved irresistible.
There was also the antipathy towards the UNP for its role in opposing and scuttling the B-C pact.The UNP fate was sealed.
Parliament ceremonially opened on April 19th. The Throne speech debate commenced on April 20th. On the third and final day Chelvanayakam addressed the house and attacked the UNP harshly.
“The real enemy of the Tamil speaking people is not the SLFP but the UNP.It was the UNP Bhikkus who pressured Mr. Bandaranaike to tear up the B-C pact” charged Chelvanayakam.
When the vote was taken on April 22nd the Federal Party voted along with the opposition against the UNP govt. The Throne speech was defeated by 25 votes. The Govt had 61 and opposition 86 with 08 abstentions.
After an emergency meeting of cabinet Dudley Senanayake recommended to the Governor –General that Parliament be dissolved and fresh polls held.
Sir Oliver however summoned the heads of all opposition political parties and told them that he was exploring prospects of forming an alternative government instead of holding elections. It was now the turn of the SLFP with 46 seats to have a go at govt formation.
CP de SILVA
The SLFP leader CP de Silva then called upon the Governor –General and urged that he be given an opportunity to form a government. He said he had the required numbers and was confident of securing FP support.
Thereafter Sir Oliver asked SJV Chelvanayakam to call over at Queens House to ascertain whether the FP was indeed extending support to the SLFP.
On his way to Fort from his Alfred House Gardens residence in Kollupitiya, Chelvanayakam dropped in at Felix’s house in Mahanuge Gardens. Waiting there were CP de Silva and AP Jayasuriya.
Once again Chelvanayakam queried whether the assurances given by the SLFP were valid still. The answer was in the affirmative. Then Chelva asked whether the essence of the B-C pact would be implemented as promised. Again the answer was positive.
At this stage Chelvanayakam looked at fellow old Thomian and potential premier CP de Silva and asked him point blank “what guarantee is there that you would honour these assurances”? To which CP de Silva gave a characteristic response. “I drive a hard bargain and when I’ve made it,I keep it”, CP replied.
A satisfied Chelva left for Queen’s House while CP de Silva awaited his tryst with destiny. Alas! Fate decreed otherwise!
Sir Oliver Goonetilleke received Chelvanayakam and told him that he was trying to ascertain whether CP de Silva could form an alternative government. If the SLFP did not have the required numbers he was going to dissolve Parliament.
Stating that the support of the FP was crucial in this respect the Governor – General asked the FP leader categorically whether the FP would provide “unqualified” support to the SLFP led alternative government for a minimum period of two years.
Sir Oliver had stressed on “unqualified” support because he felt that the FP could be forced to withdraw support quickly if the SLFP reneged on its pledges to the party. Therefore he wanted to satisfy himself of it’s stability by eliciting a firm guarantee from Chelvanayakam.
But the lawyer in Chelvanayakam balked at the prospect of pledging “unqualified” support as requested by the G-G.
Being an honourable politician ,Chelvanayakam realised that he and the FP would be firmly bound for two years if he stated so to Sir Oliver. At the same time he could not take the political risk of extending unqualified support for 24 months if the SLFP dishonoured its assurances.
In a bid to extricate himself from this tricky situation, Chelvanayakam gave what could be termed a “smart” answer.
Chelvanayakam replied that the FP had arrived at an understanding with the SLFP and that his party would support the SLFP led govt not merely for two years but for its full term.
By this answer Chelvanayakam had avoided giving a categorical assurance about extending “unqualified support”. But the politically sagacious Sir Oliver cited this perceived reluctance on the part of the FP leader to explicitly guarantee unqualified support as proof of the proposed government’s “fragility”.
Stating that he was dissatisfied by Chelvanayakam’s answer the Governor – General went ahead and dissolved Parliament.
It is widely believed that Sir Oliver’s bias towards the UNP was the cause for this and that the Governor – General had made Chelvanayakam the “scapegoat” for this.
But there is also a less charitable explanation for Sir Oliver’s conduct.
According to Chelvanayakam’s son in law and political scientist AJ Wilson the real reason was “caste”. CP de Silva belonged to the “Salagama” caste. Wilson quotes Dr.N.M Perera as having been told by Sir Oliver “How can I appoint a Salagama man”?
Although the concept of caste is frowned upon in polite Sri Lankan society and is tabooed as being politically incorrect, a harsh reality of politics and arranged marriages is the role of the caste factor in both spheres.
It is an incontrovertible fact of contemporary history that all the Governor – Generals, Prime Ministers and Presidents of Sri Lanka have been from the Govigama caste with the singular exception/aberration of Ranasinghe Premadasa.
Whatever the reason governing the Governor – General’s action the immediate consequence was dissolution and the staging of fresh elections.
All the opposition parties including the FP protested against Sir Oliver’s action and wrote a letter criticising the move.Nevertheless new elections were held in July 1960.
As the election campaign began it soon became clear that a re-furbished SLFP would do better than it did at the March elections.
The main reason for this was the campaigning by Sirima Bandaranaike. Dubbed as the “weeping widow” by sections of the media Mrs. Bandaranaike drew unprecedented crowds at meetings.
Many of the leaders and influential segments of the SLFP who had broken away after SWRD’s death now returned to party folds. Supporters who voted for the MEP and LPP in March were also returning to the SLFP.
The SLFP also entered into a no contest pact with the Samasamajists and Communists. Thus fragmentation of the left vote was prevented.
Apart from these factors the unwritten understanding with the FP created a situation where the leading Tamil party was an “indirect” electoral ally of the SLFP.
Given the fractured verdict of March 1960 it was assumed that July 1960 too would result in a hung Parliament with the SLFP having the most amount of seats. The support of the FP was seen as crucial for govt formation.
The FP expected the SLFP to implement the promises made earlier after victory at the July elections.
Chelvanayakam met Mrs. Bandaranaike in a brief, unpublicised meeting along with Felix Bandaranaike where she assured the FP leader that she would abide by the assurances given to the FP by the delegation led by CP de Silva.
Strengthened by that assurance the FP hitched its wagon to the SLFP star.
While Chelvanayakam elicited an assurance from the SLFP over implementation the party failed to obtain guarantees in a vital respect.
Professor Wilson the biographer of Chelvanayakam points out that the FP did not obtain assurances from the SLFP as to whether the pledges would be binding on the party even if it won the polls with a comfortable majority and did not have to depend on FP support.
Apparently Chelvanayakam interpreted the assurances as being of a binding nature on the SLFP even if it had an absolute majority and did not need FP support. But this was only Chelvanayakam’s interpretation says his son in law.
No explicit guarantee on this had been sought or obtained. This lapse by the FP indicated that the party was politically naive to say the least.
Despite the absence of such a concrete guarantee the FP took a leap of faith and backed the SLFP. It appealed to Tamil voters in electorates not contested by the party to vote for the SLFP.
The FP also told crowds at political meetings that the party had arrived at an understanding with the SLFP and that the BC pact would be implemented.
This in turn resulted in the UNP launching a vicious campaign against the SLFP – FP alignment. The UNP accused the SLFP of conspiring with the FP to divide the country.
A highlight of this campaign was the widespread display of a colourful poster portraying the Island of Ceylon as a gigantic cake.
The poster showed Mrs. Bandaranaike slicing up the North and east of the cake with CP de Silva looking on.Chelvanayakam waits with an outstretched tray for his slice with his deputy EMV Naganathan standing behind.
The UNP allegation that a secret deal had been worked out between the SLFP and FP put the former on the defensive. Felix Dias Bandaranaike urged the FP to deny publicly that there was a SLFP- FP agreement.
Chelvanayakam obliged reluctantly by issuing a statement where he said the FP had supported the SLFP without obtaining any agreement. He re-iterated this position in media interviews.
This in turn had the FP’s chief rival the All Ceylon Tamil Congress led by GG Ponnambalam criticising the party for missing a golden opportunity in not supporting the UNP and instead supporting the SLFP without any guarantees.
It was in this atmosphere that the SLFP and FP faced the hustings in July 1960.
Despite the alignment of convenience the SLFP could not admit to it publicly due to fear of alienating the Sinhala constituency.
The FP was in an unenviable position of being unable to acknowledge the unwritten understanding in deference to SLFP wishes
In spite of these difficulties the FP once again romped home the winner in Tamil majority electorates. It retained all 15 electorates won by the party in March. In addition the FP also won the Muslim majority electorate of Kalmunai where MC Ahamed was returned on the House symbol.
The FP had 16 seats in a Parliament of 157 and was once again the third largest political party. The UNP came second with 30 seats. The SLFP was first with 75 seats.
Together with the six appointed MP’s and support from a few Independents the party now had a slender yet stable majority. More importantly it was not dependent on FP support.
History was made when Mrs. Bandaranaike became Prime minister.
But the FP was in for a shock. Its naive expectation that the unwritten understanding with the SLFP was binding even in a situation where the government did not require FP support was rudely shattered.
The SLFP went ahead with government formation without resorting to any dialogue with the FP. The party did not regard the arrangements made before elections as binding on it. Efforts made by FP leaders to communicate with SLFP leaders failed.
When the Throne speech of the new government was presented on August 12th the FP was initially pleased. For the first time the throne speech was presented in Tamil also. This initial happiness evaporated rapidly as the content was revealed.
There were no references to the pre-poll promises made to the FP about district councils or Tamil language provisions.
Instead the govt announced full implementation of Sinhala as the sole official language from January 1st 1961. The govt also said Sinhala would be the sole language of courts.
A thoroughly disillusioned FP was now the laughing stock among its Tamil detractors.
The party was seen as being deceived and let down by the SLFP for the second time. The FP was accused of having blundered badly in not supporting Dudley Senanayake
On the other hand the SLFP govt went ahead at full speed with total “Sinhalaisation” of the administration.
This rendered the Tamil people increasingly vulnerable and made them insecure. In that climate there was tremendous pressure on the FP to resist these moves.
The stage was being set for an inevitable political confrontation. The course of events between the March and July elections had laid the groundwork for such a clash.
Events gathered momentum and reached a logical conclusion on February 20th 1961 in the form of a “Satyagraha” campaign. The nature, scope and consequences of the 1961 Satyagraha would be related and examined in forthcoming articles
DBS Jeyaraj can be reached at email@example.com